



Political Questions and the Ultra Vires 
Conundrum 
Richard H. Fallon Jr† 
This Article advances a novel theory of the political question doctrine by locat-
ing its foundations in a conundrum about ultra vires action, exemplified by the an-
cient question: Who will guard the guardians? The political question doctrine marks 
some questions as ultra vires the judicial power, or beyond the jurisdiction of courts 
to resolve. Correspondingly, designation of a question as political typically identifies 
it as lying within the jurisdiction of a nonjudicial institution to settle. Even after 
denominating a question as political, however, courts retain a responsibility to check 
actions by other institutions that overreach those institutions’ authority and thus 
are themselves ultra vires. The need for the judiciary to press to the outer limits of 
its jurisdiction to rein in ultra vires action by other institutions renders political 
question rulings less categorical, and also less distinct from merits decisions, than 
both judges and commentators have often imagined. The inescapable role of the 
courts in identifying ultra vires action by other branches also highlights the possi-
bility of ultra vires action by the courts themselves. 
The paired risks of ultra vires action by the courts and ultra vires action by 
other branches if the courts could not assert jurisdiction to restrain them—both 
made vivid by the political question doctrine—define what this Article calls the ultra 
vires conundrum. The ultra vires conundrum, in turn, gives rise to what we might 
think of as ultimate political questions: What happens if courts err in their determi-
nation of the outer bounds of their own power? If the courts act ultra vires, do their 
decisions bind conscientious officials of other branches? And if not, who gets to de-
cide when judicial action is ultra vires? 
Besides formulating the ultra vires conundrum and answering the questions 
that define its core, this Article solves a number of more traditional, interrelated 
puzzles about the political question doctrine that appear in a new light once the ultra 
vires conundrum lies exposed. It also traces previously unexplored connections be-
tween political questions and the ideal of the rule of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The political question doctrine—which affirms that some con-
stitutional questions lie beyond judicial jurisdiction to resolve, 
and can in some instances be settled authoritatively by other 
branches—occupies an odd status. Although such a doctrine in-
disputably exists, debate abounds concerning its nature and foun-
dations.1 As an additional basis for puzzlement, the Supreme 
Court almost never invokes the political question doctrine. 
 
 1 See Parts II–III. Some commentators deny that it should exist at all. See, for ex-
ample, Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 Nw U L Rev 
1031, 1059–60 (1985); Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 Yale L 
J 597, 622 (1976) (arguing that “[t]he ‘political question’ doctrine . . . is an unnecessary, 
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The Court’s most recent deployment of the political question 
concept in Rucho v Common Cause2—to hold challenges to parti-
san gerrymanders nonjusticiable3—was therefore unusual as well 
as controversial. In 2004, Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality opin-
ion in Vieth v Jubelirer4 had prefigured Rucho by concluding that 
political gerrymanders present political questions due to an ab-
sence of judicially manageable standards for determining when 
partisan advantage seeking goes “too far.”5 But Justice Scalia 
could not muster a majority either on that occasion or in a subse-
quent gerrymandering case.6 
If one puts Vieth aside, only twice since the 1930s had the 
Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of a case on political ques-
tion grounds prior to Rucho. In Gilligan v Morgan,7 which held 
that a suit for injunctive relief against National Guard officials 
presented a political question, the Court reasoned that Article I 
grants Congress “the responsibility for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining the Militia . . . with certain responsibilities being  
reserved to the respective States.”8 In light of Article I’s delega-
tion of authority to Congress and the president’s powers as com-
mander in chief, the Court ruled that it would be inappropriate 
for the judiciary to intrude in ongoing, discretionary decisions 
about training and choice of weaponry.9 In Nixon v United 
States,10 the Court concluded that Article I, § 3, clause 6, which 
provides in part that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to 
try all Impeachments,”11 gives the Senate judicially unreviewable 
 
deceptive packaging of several established doctrines” that sometimes appropriately deny 
relief, including denial of remedies “for want of equity”). 
 2 139 S Ct 2484 (2019). 
 3 Id at 2508. 
 4 541 US 267 (2004). 
 5 Id at 296 (Scalia) (plurality). Prior to Vieth, in a concurrence joined by Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had 
argued that challenges to political gerrymanders presented political questions. See Davis 
v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 144 (1986) (O’Connor concurring in the judgment). 
 6 See League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 511 (2006) 
(Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In a more recent case, 
the Court avoided the question whether challenges to partisan gerrymanders present po-
litical questions by holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing. Gill v Whit-
ford, 138 S Ct 1916, 1933–34 (2018). 
 7 413 US 1 (1973). 
 8 Id at 6. 
 9 Id at 7–11. 
 10 506 US 224 (1993). 
 11 US Const Art I, § 3, cl 6. 
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authority to determine the procedural requisites of an impeach-
ment trial.12 The Court was fortified in this conclusion, it said, by 
an absence of judicially manageable standards for resolving im-
peachment disputes.13 
Rucho was different. Unlike in Gilligan and Nixon, the Court 
found no constitutional commitment of authority to another 
branch with which judicial involvement might interfere. In espe-
cially sharp contrast with Nixon, in which the Court ruled that 
the Constitution charges the Senate, rather than the courts, with 
interpreting the Impeachment Trial Clause, Rucho did not point 
to any other institution to which the Constitution commits  
responsibility to enforce the Equal Protection Clause or the First 
Amendment, the two provisions on which the challengers princi-
pally relied. Instead, the Court based its ruling entirely on the 
absence of judicially manageable standards “for deciding how 
much partisan dominance is too much.”14 
This Article advances a novel theory of the political question 
doctrine. It seeks to reframe thinking about political questions by 
demonstrating that a single, inescapable conundrum—which 
prior scholarship has failed to diagnose—both explains the polit-
ical question doctrine and haunts Supreme Court decisions about 
whether to apply it in most of the modern cases. The conundrum, 
which may be endemic to judicial review within a constitutional 
democracy, involves the threat or phenomenon of ultra vires ac-
tion—or action that exceeds the outer bounds of lawful author-
ity—by any constitutionally empowered and limited institution, 
including but not restricted to the judiciary. The ultra vires co-
nundrum may be less visible in Rucho than in cases such as Nixon 
in which the issue turns on whether the Constitution assigns re-
sponsibility for resolving a constitutional dispute to a branch 
other than the judiciary. Even in Rucho, however, it forms a cru-
cial part of the background. 
 
 12 Nixon, 506 US at 226. 
 13 Id at 228–29: 
As the discussion that follows makes clear, the concept of a textual commitment 
to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept 
of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that 
there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch. 
 14 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2498, quoting League of United Latin American Citizens, 548 
US at 420 (Kennedy) (Kennedy writing only for himself in this portion of the opinion). 
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The conundrum, in a nutshell, is this: The political question 
doctrine marks some questions as ultra vires, or beyond the juris-
diction of courts to resolve. Even after denominating a question 
as political, however, courts typically retain a responsibility to 
check actions by other institutions that overreach the outer limits 
of those institutions’ authority. As a result, denomination of a 
question as a political question marks a less categorical commit-
ment to judicial nonintervention than many and perhaps most 
commentators have imagined. Furthermore, the less-than- 
categorical effect of political question rulings invites the question: 
What happens if courts, in claiming to identify ultra vires action 
by other branches, err in their determination of the outer bounds 
of their own power? If the courts act ultra vires, do their decisions 
bind conscientious officials of other branches? And if not, who gets 
to decide when judicial action is ultra vires? In this Article, I ar-
gue that these questions loom in the background when the Su-
preme Court purports to determine the outer limits of the judicial 
power to decide constitutional questions authoritatively. 
Even when the Supreme Court decides exceedingly conten-
tious constitutional questions—in Citizens United v Federal Elec-
tion Commission15 or Roe v Wade,16 for example—we ordinarily 
take it for granted that the Court’s ruling should, and indeed 
must, be authoritative; it is the function of the courts “to say what 
the law is.”17 To express the point in terminology introduced by 
Professor H.L.A. Hart, the rule of recognition in our legal system 
almost invariably requires both citizens and nonjudicial officials 
to accept judicial determinations.18 But that ordinary assumption 
depends on the premise that the court resolving a question acted 
within its jurisdiction.19 
In the case of a serious claim that a judicial ruling was ultra 
vires, different questions would present themselves. A judicial 
ruling that was ultra vires—for example, one determining that 
the Senate’s conviction of an impeached president was constitu-
tionally invalid, if we take Nixon’s holding as a fixed point—
 
 15 558 US 310 (2010). 
 16 410 US 113 (1973). 
 17 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 18 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94–95, 100–10, 116, 256 (Clarendon 2d ed 
1994) (discussing the nature and functions of the rule or rules of recognition). 
 19 See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Georgetown L J 1807, 1862 (2008) 
(arguing that the judicial power to bind the president applies only when a court is acting 
within its jurisdiction). 
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would, in Professor Charles Black’s resonant phrase, have no “ti-
tle to be[ ] obeyed.”20 And when a serious claim is made that a 
judicial ruling is ultra vires, the question thus necessarily 
emerges: Who gets to decide, authoritatively, whether the Su-
preme Court, in ruling that a question is not a political question 
and in purporting to settle it on the merits, has exceeded the  
jurisdiction-based limits of its claim to obedience? In my view, no 
analysis of the judicially defined political question doctrine could 
be satisfying without exploring its relationship to the ultimate 
political questions of whether ultra vires judicial decisions would 
deserve to be obeyed and, if not, of who would and should deter-
mine whether judicial decisions are ultra vires. 
Formulating the ultra vires conundrum inaugurates, but 
does not complete, this Article’s reconceptualizing agenda. After 
laying out the ultra vires conundrum, this Article goes on to solve 
a number of more traditional, interrelated puzzles about the po-
litical question doctrine that appear in a new light once that co-
nundrum lies exposed. 
The first involves whether the political question doctrine is 
jurisdictional. The modern Supreme Court says recurrently that 
the political question doctrine expresses Article III’s limitation of 
the judicial power to the resolution of cases and issues fit for ju-
dicial decision.21 But reflection on the ultra vires conundrum and 
on the details of sometimes-overlooked Supreme Court rulings es-
tablishes that the identification of a question as political fre-
quently does not entail that the Court lacks subject matter juris-
diction. Perhaps more typically, identification of a question as 
political requires judicial acceptance of the ruling of another 
branch as authoritative, as long as the ruling is not ultra vires. 
 
 20 Charles L. Black Jr, Impeachment: A Handbook 61–62 (Yale 1974). 
 21 See, for example, Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2494 (asserting that before deciding a ques-
tion of constitutional law, a court must ascertain that “the question is presented in a ‘case’ 
or ‘controversy’ that is, in James Madison’s words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature’”), quoting Daim-
lerChrysler Corp v Cuno, 547 US 332, 342 (2006); Zivotofsky v Clinton, 566 US 189, 195 
(2012) (asserting that a court “lacks the authority to decide [a] dispute” involving a politi-
cal question); DaimlerChrysler Corp, 547 US at 352 (tracing the political question doctrine 
to “Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language”); Gilligan, 413 US at 9 (asserting that fed-
eral courts “have no jurisdiction” over “nonjusticiable political question[s]”) (emphasis 
omitted), quoting Morgan v Rhodes, 456 F2d 608, 619 (6th Cir 1972) (Celebrezze dissent-
ing); Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 518 (1969) (“[F]ederal courts will not adjudicate 
political questions.”). See also Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question 
Doctrine, 90 NYU L Rev 1908, 1948–50 (2015) (emphasizing the jurisdictional character 
of the modern political question doctrine). 
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Insofar as Rucho marks an exception to this norm, it is only a 
partial exception. 
A second traditional puzzle concerns the bases on which 
courts properly identify political questions. I defend a pluralist 
approach that subsumes a variety of theories that others have 
viewed as mutually exclusive. In particular, I explain how pru-
dential reasoning can occur within—rather than as an alternative 
to—analysis focused on the rights of the parties to a lawsuit and 
the constitutional powers and obligations of the judicial branch. 
A third question follows from the answer to the second: If 
multiple grounds support invocation of the political question doc-
trine, why does the Supreme Court apply it so seldom? The an-
swer, I argue, has to do with the nature of modern constitutional 
law and, in particular, with the wide range of factors that today 
affect constitutional adjudication on the merits. The political 
question doctrine has shrunk almost to nothing in the Supreme 
Court22 because the kinds of considerations that bear on political 
question determinations are frequently inseparable from the con-
siderations that bear on merits rulings. Seen in the context of a 
myriad of other judicial decisions—including those in which the 
Supreme Court established the one-person, one-vote principle—
Rucho is the exception that proves the rule. 
If merits and political question reasoning overlap to such a 
great extent, a fourth question arises: Why does the Supreme 
Court preserve a political question doctrine at all? My answer 
holds that the political question doctrine endures because the 
Court, understandably and appropriately, wants to maintain a 
mechanism with which to signal as adamantly as possible that 
neither other branches, nor litigants, nor the public can look to 
the judiciary to resolve a question that the Court believes ill-
suited for judicial decision. Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
 
 22 The doctrine appears to have a greater importance in the lower courts. See J. Peter 
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U Pa L Rev 97, 107 nn 26–27 
(1988) (discussing its application to the constitutionality of the wars in Vietnam and Nic-
aragua); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 Am U L Rev 1295, 
1325 (2012) (discussing its application in national security cases); Rachel E. Barkow, More 
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy, 102 Colum L Rev 237, 267 n 158 (2002). A partial explanation for the dispar-
ity may be that the lower courts, unlike the Supreme Court, cannot simply deny certiorari 
as a means of avoiding the need to resolve questions that they think they ought not to 
resolve. See, for example, Lexmark International, Inc v Static Control Components, Inc, 
572 US 118, 126 (2014) (affirming “that ‘a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide’ 
cases within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually unflagging’”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting 
Sprint Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 571 US 69, 77 (2013). 
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the Court, the signal sent by political question rulings comes at a 
cost. The justices dislike acknowledging that some of their deci-
sions, were they to make them, would be ultra vires and thus of 
questionable legal authority. 
With the connection of the Supreme Court’s administration 
of the political question doctrine to the ultra vires conundrum 
thus laid bare, this Article turns to its third major aim: to explore 
how our system would and ought to respond to the questions aris-
ing from claims by one of the political branches that the judiciary 
has acted ultra vires. In a showdown, would and should the 
Court’s certification that it had properly exercised its jurisdiction 
necessarily prevail? Whether a court has so drastically over-
stepped is, I shall argue, the ultimate species of political ques-
tion—one that officials of other branches and, in the final account-
ing, the citizens of the United States must decide for themselves.23 
The Article comprises five Parts. Part I elaborates the ultra 
vires conundrum. With the ultra vires conundrum exposed, 
Part II maps some varieties of political questions and discusses 
the diverse senses in which they are jurisdictional. Even in cases 
presenting political questions, Part II argues, the courts remain 
available to identify and check ultra vires action by other 
branches if it should occur. Part III reviews traditional theories 
of the political question doctrine and argues that none is individ-
ually adequate. A pluralist account is needed. With Part III hav-
ing recognized multiple doctrinal foundations for judicial invoca-
tion of the political question doctrine, Part IV raises and answers 
the question why, as an empirical matter, the Supreme Court ap-
plies the doctrine to so few cases. Its response emphasizes the ul-
tra vires conundrum and the Supreme Court’s reluctance to issue 
reminders that some imaginable rulings on the merits of consti-
tutional disputes would overstep the limits of judicial power. 
Part V discusses appropriate responses to the ultra vires conun-
drum, including in cases of possible ultra vires action by the judi-
cial branch. It argues that whether judicial action is ultra vires 
and therefore undeserving of obedience constitutes the ultimate 
political question and proposes normative guidelines for address-
ing that question if it should ever arise. 
 
 23 See, for example, Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433, 459 (1939) (Black concurring) 
(arguing that Congress’s power over the process of constitutional amendment is “exclu-
sive” and Congress would be “under no duty to accept the pronouncements upon that ex-
clusive power by this Court”). 
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I.  THE ULTRA VIRES CONUNDRUM 
At the root of the political question doctrine and furnishing 
the background to most of its applications is an enduring problem 
of constitutional governance. The ultra vires conundrum unfolds 
in three layers. At the surface level, when the Supreme Court 
rules that an issue is a political question, it designates that issue 
as beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to decide authoritatively.24 
In other words, the Court determines that a judicial resolution on 
the merits—for example, a ruling that the Senate had or had not 
provided the kind of trial that the Constitution requires in the 
Nixon case or that North Carolina had relied too much on parti-
san considerations in designing voting districts in Rucho—would 
be ultra vires, or beyond the scope of judicial power under  
Article III.25 
The second layer of the ultra vires conundrum appears with 
special vividness in Nixon and other cases involving “textually de-
monstrable commitment[s]” of constitutional issues to institu-
tions other than the judiciary.26 It emerges if we now consider the 
possibility of ultra vires action, not by the courts, but by the non-
judicial institution with authority to resolve an issue. Jurisdiction 
to decide an issue typically and perhaps always includes the au-
thority to commit mistakes.27 It signifies a power that can be ex-
ercised either correctly or incorrectly, at least within bounds.28 
But there is a limit: recognition of jurisdiction in a nonjudicial 
branch to interpret the Constitution does not vitiate the possibil-
ity of ultra vires action by that other branch in the purported ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction.29 Ultra vires action—which blurs along a 
spectrum with mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction—defines 
a practically, if not conceptually, necessary limit on the political 
question doctrine. 
 
 24 See note 21 and accompanying text. 
 25 For another example, see Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 
101–02 (1998) (characterizing judicial action in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction 
as “ultra vires”). 
 26 See Nixon, 506 US at 228–29. 
 27 See, for example, Estep v United States, 327 US 114, 122–23 (1946). 
 28 See, for example, In re Yamashita, 327 US 1, 8 (1946); Ng Fung Ho v White, 259 
US 276, 284 (1922). 
 29 See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217 (1962) (stressing that the courts “will not stand 
impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power”); 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 John Mar-
shall L Rev 441, 456 (2004) (“[I]f [another branch’s] interpretive authority is not to be 
completely unbounded, the Court still must have final authority to decide whether the 
political branches are acting within an appropriate category.”). 
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Among cases decided to date, perhaps the clearest example of 
the Supreme Court’s policing of the outer boundaries of another 
branch’s otherwise exclusive authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion involves the Guarantee Clause.30 In Luther v Borden31 and 
again in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co v Oregon,32 
the Court affirmed that disputes under the Guarantee Clause 
pose political questions.33 Notwithstanding those decisions, 
Coyle v Smith34 invalidated a federal statute that forbade Okla-
homa to move its state capital. In Coyle, the Court reasoned that 
even though the Guarantee Clause conferred a broad scope of ju-
dicially unreviewable jurisdiction on Congress, Congress over-
reached the bounds of its authority when it sought to condition a 
state’s admission to the Union on terms that would deprive it of 
equal status with other states.35 
The same logic would apply to disputes under other provi-
sions that the Supreme Court has identified as conferring judi-
cially unreviewable authority on other branches.36 For example, 
 
 30 US Const Art IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; 
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.”). 
 31 48 US (7 How) 1 (1849). 
 32 223 US 118 (1912). 
 33 See Luther, 48 US (7 How) at 42; Pacific States, 223 US at 150. 
 34 221 US 559 (1911). 
 35 Id at 567–68 (citations omitted): 
The argument that Congress derives from the duty of “guaranteeing to each 
State in this Union a republican form of government,” power to impose re-
strictions upon a new State which deprives it of equality with other members of 
the Union, has no merit. It may imply the duty of such new State to provide itself 
with such state government, and impose upon Congress the duty of seeing that 
such form is not changed to one anti-republican, but it obviously does not confer 
power to admit a new State which shall be any less a State than those which 
compose the Union. 
 36 Commentators have made the same point about other constitutional provisions 
that give rise to political questions. For example, the Supreme Court has held that 
whether a constitutional amendment has been validly ratified is a political question, com-
mitted by the Constitution for resolution by Congress. See Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433, 
455–56 (1939). Accepting the Court’s ruling, Professor Laurence Tribe maintains—
through the device of a rhetorical question—that Coleman’s holding could not plausibly 
extend to plainly ultra vires action: 
Could anyone really believe, for example, that a court would feel bound to treat 
the [E]qual [R]ights [A]mendment (ERA) as part of the Constitution if Congress 
determined that the thirty-five states that had ratified the amendment as of 
July 1, 1982, constituted the “three fourths” of fifty required by [A]rticle V? 
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained 
Judicial Role, 97 Harv L Rev 433, 433 (1983). 
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imagine that the Senate, following Nixon, adopted the position 
that its power to “try” impeachments included the authority to 
sentence impeached officials to hard labor or to seize their assets 
as a punishment for high crimes and misdemeanors—in flat con-
travention of Article I, § 3, clause 7, which provides that “Judg-
ment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”37 It 
seems intuitive that the Senate would not merely err, but exceed 
its jurisdiction, if, at the conclusion of an impeachment trial, it 
purported to impose a punishment beyond removal from office.38 
A similar but more limited conclusion emerges from reflec-
tion on Rucho, the only case so far in which the Supreme Court 
has characterized a claim of individual constitutional rights as 
presenting a political question solely due to the absence of judi-
cially manageable standards. Despite the majority’s emphatic de-
termination that whether, and if so when, partisan gerrymanders 
violate the Constitution is a political question, the unreviewable 
discretion of state authorities is bounded by judicially managea-
ble standards that forbid gerrymanders that violate one-person, 
one-vote principles.39 To put the point in more conceptual terms, 
although cases finding a lack of judicially manageable standards 
acknowledge an absence of enforceable limits on legislative dis-
cretion along one dimension, other judicially enforceable limits on 
legislative power may remain. 
In sum, a ruling by the Supreme Court that exercises of au-
thority by another branch under a particular constitutional pro-
vision give rise to political questions does not establish that courts 
could never entertain challenges to the other branch’s assertions 
of purported authority. Rather, the Court’s denomination of a 
question as political typically establishes only that the judicial 
branch has no role in reviewing the action of another branch ei-
ther within bounded limits or along a dimension where judicially 
enforceable limits are singularly lacking. 
Recognition of the need for judicial policing of the bounds of 
other branches’ jurisdiction to resolve political questions exposes 
the third and most fundamental layer of the ultra vires problem. 
The irresolvable conundrum of the political question doctrine 
 
 37 US Const Art I, § 3, cl 7. 
 38 See note 29. 
 39 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 557–58 (1964). 
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arises because the Supreme Court, in labeling a question as a po-
litical question, acknowledges and symbolizes limits on its juris-
diction by affirming that for it to attempt to resolve a particular 
question on the merits would be ultra vires.40 Yet the Court—
which is a fallible institution—sometimes must risk engaging in 
ultra vires action in order to stop ultra vires action by other 
branches. 
As I explain more fully below, the possibility of ultra vires 
judicial action is real. So is the question of how other institutions 
should respond to what they believe to be ultra vires judicial ac-
tion—an issue that I take up in Part V. For now, it is enough to 
draw two provisional conclusions about the implications of the ul-
tra vires problem for traditional understandings of the political 
question doctrine. First, political question rulings are less abso-
lute and categorical than is often imagined. Although eschewing 
jurisdiction to correct mere errors by other branches in political 
question cases, courts typically retain jurisdiction to police the 
outer boundaries of other institutions’ authority if other institu-
tions should stray ultra vires. Second, recognition that the reach 
and limits of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction interact with other 
branches’ jurisdiction, and that other institutions are capable of 
ultra vires action in cases that the courts have characterized as 
presenting political questions, imbues the political question doc-
trine with a myriad of complexities that I explore in subsequent 
parts. 
II.  THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: CONCEPTUAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
Among the mysteries surrounding the political question doc-
trine is whether it is jurisdictional and, if so, what the term “ju-
risdictional” imports. The Supreme Court recurrently describes 
the political question doctrine as jurisdictional.41 In doing so, 
moreover, it appears to contemplate that the existence of a polit-
ical question implies an absence of subject matter jurisdiction 
that requires the dismissal of a suit or claim as immediately and 
categorically as would a determination that the plaintiff lacks 
 
 40 See Steel Co, 523 US at 101–02 (concluding that the purported exercise of judicial 
power beyond the bounds of Article III “is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires”). 
 41 See note 21 and accompanying text. 
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standing or that a dispute is moot.42 By contrast, a few commen-
tators have insisted that the political question doctrine is not ju-
risdictional at all.43 
Viewed in light of the ultra vires conundrum, the question 
whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional assumes 
a new intricacy. The ultra vires conundrum, which arises from 
competing claims of jurisdiction to resolve issues authoritatively, 
highlights the possibility that not every identification of a ques-
tion as political necessarily signals an absence of judicial subject 
matter jurisdiction. Sometimes identification of a political ques-
tion marks a limit on subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit 
and requires dismissal without further action or inquiry. Other 
times, however, a court, recognizing that an issue lies within the 
jurisdiction of another branch to decide, might accept the other 
branch’s decision as a basis for either granting or denying relief 
on the merits. A still-valuable reminder of the multifariousness 
of the political question doctrine comes from its canonical formu-
lation in Baker v Carr:44 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi-
cal question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility 
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of gov-
ernment; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question. 
 
 42 See, for example, Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497, 516 (2007) (affirming “famil-
iar learning that no justiciable ‘controversy’ exists when parties seek adjudication of a 
political question”). 
 43 See John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 Am U L Rev 457, 460, 481 
(2017) (arguing that the political question doctrine is not jurisdictional and that it has 
always consisted of two strains: a set of scenarios in which another branch’s application of 
law to fact is final and a rule against “[r]emedies that would direct political discretion”). 
See also Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 600–01 (cited in note 1) (arguing that many cases labeled 
as finding political questions instead uphold governmental action on the merits or deny 
equitable remedies). 
 44 369 US 186 (1962). 
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Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case 
at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on 
the ground of a political question’s presence.45 
More recent cases—including Nixon, Zivotofsky v Clinton,46 
and Rucho—seem to focus almost exclusively on just two of the 
Baker criteria: textually demonstrable commitments to other 
branches and a lack of judicially manageable standards.47 But no 
subsequent case purports to revise Baker in any respect. 
In correcting misconceptions that have grown up around the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that political question determina-
tions are jurisdictional, this Part emphasizes two related points. 
First, there are diverse kinds of political questions, of which I sin-
gle out three: political questions arising from other branches’ de-
cisions not involving constitutional interpretation, constitutional 
questions committed to nonjudicial branches, and constitutional 
questions for which courts cannot identify judicially manageable 
standards. Second, the jurisdictional label has different implica-
tions in different kinds of cases. 
A. Political Questions Arising from Other Branches’ Decisions 
Not Involving Constitutional Interpretation 
In the modern Supreme Court’s preoccupation with political 
questions that both involve constitutional interpretation and re-
quire the dismissal of claims to relief as beyond the jurisdiction of 
courts to entertain, the justices appear to have lost sight of a more 
old-fashioned category. Political questions in the old-fashioned 
sense typically arise as courts resolve disputed, subconstitutional 
claims to relief on the merits and accord finality to the determi-
nations of another branch.48 An example comes from Williams v 
Suffolk Insurance Co.49 Liability under an insurance contract ar-
guably depended on whether the Falkland Islands came within 
the sovereign jurisdiction of Argentina.50 In pronouncing that the 
status of the Falkland Islands was a political question, the Court 
signified only that it must accept the executive’s negative decision 
 
 45 Id at 217. 
 46 566 US 189 (2012). 
 47 See Nixon, 506 US at 228; Zivotofsky, 566 US at 195; Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2494. 
 48 See Harrison, 67 Am U L Rev at 460 (cited in note 43). 
 49 38 US (13 Pet) 415 (1839). 
 50 Id at 417. 
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as conclusive.51 The Court lacked jurisdiction, in the sense of au-
thority, to decide for itself a question on which the political 
branches had already spoken. Nevertheless, the Court retained 
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim to relief.52 
Kennett v Chambers53 furnishes another example of a political 
question ruling that did not involve a constitutional issue and did 
not signify an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The dispute 
again involved a contract, the enforceability of which depended 
on whether Texas was at relevant times an independent state or 
a rebellious Mexican province.54 The Supreme Court ruled that 
Texas’s status was a political question and that until the execu-
tive branch recognized Texas as an independent state, “the judi-
cial tribunals of the country were bound to consider” that it re-
mained part of Mexico, a country with which the United States 
had diplomatic relations.55 Based on that determination, the 
Court found that the contract was void and unenforceable but not 
that the dispute was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to resolve.56 
If a jurisdictional bar applies in the category of cases present-
ing subconstitutional issues that nonjudicial departments are em-
powered to decide authoritatively, it involves jurisdiction to make 
independent determinations of particular issues, not jurisdiction 
over the parties or the subject matter of a dispute, the absence of 
which would preclude any judicial decision on the merits.57 
B. Constitutional Questions Committed to Other Branches 
Most modern political question disputes have turned on 
whether the Constitution entrusts the resolution of constitutional 
questions to an institution other than the judiciary, typically 
through a textually demonstrable commitment of decision-making 
authority. Nixon exemplifies this possibility.58 No one disputed 
 
 51 See id at 420. 
 52 Id at 422. 
 53 55 US (14 How) 38 (1852). 
 54 Id at 41. 
 55 Id at 50–51. 
 56 Id at 52. 
 57 See Harrison, 67 Am U L Rev at 486 (cited in note 43) (distinguishing subject 
matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties from authority to make independent 
determinations of issues resolved by other institutions). 
 58 See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transfor-
mation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 NC L Rev 1203, 1210 
(2002) (explaining the Nixon Court’s conclusion that “the word ‘Try’ in the Impeachment 
Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is com-
mitted to the Senate”) (citation omitted). 
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that the Senate could not validly convict Chief Judge Walter 
Nixon and remove him from office without “try[ing]” him.59 But in 
response to a complaint that the Senate had failed to conduct the 
type of trial that the Constitution requires, the Supreme Court 
determined that Article I, § 3, clause 6 represented a “textually 
demonstrable commitment” of authority to the Senate to deter-
mine the scope of the Senate’s obligations.60 According to the 
Court, the Senate had implicitly determined that its procedures 
met the constitutional requirement, and its determination was 
dispositive, even if possibly erroneous.61 
Although Nixon is widely read as holding that the Supreme 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,62 one could quarrel with 
this characterization, as Professor John Harrison notably has.63 
Harrison begins with a point that seems indisputably correct. 
Characterization of a constitutional question as a political ques-
tion based on its commitment to a branch other than the judiciary 
does not necessarily preclude judicial jurisdiction over cases, or 
claims within cases, that include political questions—even when 
resolving the political questions requires constitutional  
interpretation.64 
Luther v Borden illustrates the point. Luther was a trespass 
action in which a central issue involved whether the longstanding 
 
 59 See Nixon, 506 US at 229–30. 
 60 Id at 228–29. 
 61 See Seidman, 37 John Marshall L Rev at 453 (cited in note 29): 
[T]he political question doctrine does work only when, but for the doctrine, the 
losing party in a law suit would have been victorious. Thus, a judge relying on 
the political question doctrine must start by asserting that a right has been vio-
lated. But it is precisely in the cases where the political question doctrine makes 
a difference that the judge must also deprive the right of efficacy. Put differently, 
giving the political question doctrine work to do always means frustrating the 
work that rights would otherwise do. 
 62 See, for example, Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual 
Rights: The Other Nixon v United States, 1993 S Ct Rev 125, 128 (reading Nixon as holding 
that “the question whether the Senate breached its duty to ‘try’ Nixon is a nonjusticiable 
political question” and that “the Court will not consider any case presenting an issue about 
whether the procedures used during an impeachment trial comported with any standard 
of adequacy associated with notions of what constitutes a ‘trial’”); Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 Duke L 
J 231, 244 (1994) (observing that “the determination of a political question requires a court 
to make the kind of decision it must routinely make in adjudicating preliminary issues 
about the ripeness or mootness of a lawsuit, personal jurisdiction, and standing”). 
 63 Harrison, 67 Am U L Rev at 481, 504 (cited in note 43) (interpreting Nixon as 
according “finality” to a determination by the Senate, not finding an absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction). 
 64 See id at 460–68. 
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government of Rhode Island was a constitutionally lawful one un-
der the Guarantee Clause,65 which provides that “[t]he United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against In-
vasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Vio-
lence.”66 The Supreme Court found that question to be political in 
character, and committed to Congress by the Guarantee Clause, 
with Congress in turn having authorized the president by statute 
to call out the militia as might be necessary to suppress insurrec-
tion.67 Because the Court believed that the political branches had 
implicitly resolved the disputed question against the plaintiff, it 
affirmed an order of dismissal, but it did so on the merits.68 In 
ordering dismissal on the merits, the Court accepted, and viewed 
itself as bound by, the decision of the political branches concern-
ing the lawful status of the Rhode Island government under the 
Guarantee Clause.69 If the political branches had reached a differ-
ent decision, the case would still have turned on a political ques-
tion, but Luther’s trespass action against a defendant who 
pleaded a defense of state authorization for his actions might 
have succeeded. 
The idea of the Supreme Court being bound by other 
branches’ constitutional interpretations—under the Impeach-
ment Trial Clause or the Guarantee Clause, for example—strikes 
some commentators as anomalous.70 But those critics of the polit-
ical question doctrine purport to find anomaly or mystery where 
none exists, provided that one keeps the ultra vires limitation on 
judicial reliance on other branches’ determinations in mind. Un-
der a variety of long-established doctrines, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, can sometimes be bound by the rulings of other 
institutions, including on constitutional matters, as long as the 
other institutions act within the scope of their jurisdiction. One 
 
 65 Luther, 48 US (7 How) at 34–35, 42.  
 66 US Const Art IV, § 4. 
 67 See Luther, 48 US (7 How) at 42–44. 
 68 Id at 46–47. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See, for example, Redish, 79 Nw U L Rev at 1059–60 (cited in note 1) (“Once we 
make the initial assumption that judicial review plays a legitimate role in a constitutional 
democracy, we must abandon the political question doctrine, in all of its manifestations.”); 
Brown, 1993 S Ct Rev at 131 (cited in note 62) (“The assumption that provides the neces-
sary logical premise to each of the steps in the Court’s [political question] analysis is an-
tithetical to the system of separated powers and checks and balances embodied in the 
Constitution.”). 
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example comes from the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, 
under which courts sometimes view themselves as bound by the 
legal and even the constitutional determinations of other tribu-
nals or institutions, provided that those institutions acted within 
the bounds of their jurisdiction and afforded a fair opportunity for 
the litigation of disputed claims or issues.71 
Sometimes, moreover, the law requires courts to treat nonju-
dicial rulings as conclusive. An example emerges from the tradi-
tions of habeas corpus, pursuant to which a court would inquire 
only into whether a detaining authority had jurisdiction to effect 
a detention.72 Within the traditional framework, whether a sol-
dier was lawfully held or incarcerated in wartime lay within the 
jurisdiction of military authorities to determine, even though mil-
itary authorities could obviously err. A court would issue the writ 
to inquire into the legality of a detention, but it would constitute 
an adequate return if the respondent reported that the detention 
had occurred pursuant to the order of an official with lawful au-
thority to impose wartime restraints or to try and punish alleged 
violations of the laws of war.73 If satisfied that detaining authori-
ties had acted within the scope of their jurisdiction, courts would 
not inquire further into whether the respondents had correctly 
resolved the questions of law or fact on which their decisions 
rested.74 Nevertheless, the judicial denial of the writ would repre-
sent a decision on the merits, not a dismissal of the petition for 
want of jurisdiction. 
 
 71 See, for example, Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 101 (1980) (finding no sign that 
when Congress enacted 42 USC § 1983, it “intended to allow relitigation of federal issues 
decided after a full and fair hearing in a state court simply because the state court’s deci-
sion may have been erroneous”); Migra v Warren City School District Board of Education, 
465 US 75, 83–84 (1984) (extending Allen to claim preclusion). 
 72 See, for example, Ex parte Reed, 100 US 13, 23 (1879) (“Having had such jurisdic-
tion, [the tribunal’s] proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached for any mere error or 
irregularity, if there were such, committed within the sphere of its authority.”); Dynes v 
Hoover, 61 US (20 How) 65, 74 (1857) (“As the [military] court had jurisdiction, no errors 
committed in its exercise can be reviewed or corrected by this court.”). See also Richard H. 
Fallon Jr, John Manning, Daniel Meltzer, and David Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1238 (Foundation 7th ed 2015) (“[P]recedents often 
state that habeas review is limited to questions of jurisdiction.”). 
 73 See Ludecke v Watkins, 335 US 160, 173 (1948) (concluding “that full responsibil-
ity for the just exercise of [the] great power” to detain and remove enemy aliens “may 
validly be left where the Congress has constitutionally placed it—on the President of the 
United States”); Moyer v Peabody, 212 US 78, 85 (1909) (noting that “[p]ublic danger war-
rants the substitution of executive process for judicial process” in review of executive de-
tention during a period of insurrection). 
 74 See Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 775 (1950) (stating that “[o]nce these ju-
risdictional elements have been determined, courts will not inquire into any other issue 
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Furthermore, and perhaps more to the point for current pur-
poses, a return to the writ asserting that a custodian had lawful 
jurisdiction to detain a prisoner would not be utterly conclusive. 
A court would always have jurisdiction to determine, at the least, 
whether an assertion of jurisdiction by a particular official under 
particular circumstances was lawful.75 For example, if executive 
jurisdiction to detain a civilian without trial depended on whether 
the civilian was a citizen of a country at war with the United 
States or whether the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had 
been validly suspended, courts would ascertain whether those 
predicates were satisfied. And the assertion of judicial jurisdic-
tion, in turn, created the possibility of competing claims of ultra 
vires action by the executive and judicial branches. That possibil-
ity was famously realized in Ex parte Merryman,76 which pre-
sented a question about the validity of a purported suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus. I discuss Merryman extensively below.77 
C. Constitutional Questions for Which Courts Cannot Identify 
Judicially Manageable Standards 
The Supreme Court denominates a further set of questions 
as political based on an absence of judicially manageable stand-
ards for resolving them. Questions involving an absence of judi-
cially manageable standards lie beyond the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts in a different way and for different reasons from those 
that apply in cases involving textually demonstrable commit-
ments to other branches. 
As Rucho illustrates, this category need not involve a com-
mitment of interpretive responsibility to another branch. In 
Rucho, it is implausible to imagine that the Constitution assigns 
responsibility to state legislatures to identify and remedy the 
 
as to [an enemy alien’s] internment”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 1, 25 (1942) (rejecting the 
contention that, in reviewing the trial of enemy combatants before a military commission, 
a reviewing court can consider issues unrelated to the “basis of the Commission’s authority”). 
 75 See, for example, Eisentrager, 339 US at 775, citing Ludecke, 335 US at 160: 
The resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, intern-
ment and deportation whenever a “declared war” exists. Courts will entertain 
his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a 
state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien Enemy 
Act. Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts will not 
inquire into any other issue as to his internment. 
 76 17 F Cases 144 (CC D Md 1861). 
 77 See Part IV.B. 
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equal protection and First Amendment violations that the plain-
tiffs alleged. In addition, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a 
suggestion that “through the Elections Clause, the Framers set 
aside electoral issues such as the one before us as questions that 
only Congress can resolve.”78 Nevertheless, the Court found an 
Article III bar to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction to identify 
constitutional violations and enforce constitutional norms.79 
In this category of cases, it seems plausible to think of a po-
litical question ruling as signifying an absence of judicial subject 
matter jurisdiction. Upon finding that political gerrymandering 
claims present political questions, the judicial role terminates, 
without occasion to enforce the constitutional decisions of a non-
judicial institution and without further worries about how nonju-
dicial institutions exercise their authority. Even here, however, 
there are complications in plumbing the outer boundaries of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and in identifying the point at which 
they materialize. 
The Supreme Court appears never to have given a full expli-
cation of the concept of judicially manageable standards.80 But if 
we seek to reconstruct its content from the Court’s cases—includ-
ing but not limited to discussions of the political question doc-
trine—two central points emerge. First, to count as judicially 
manageable, a standard must give intelligible guidance and yield 
reasonably consistent, predictable outcomes when applied by dif-
ferent courts to different cases.81 Second, the term judicially man-
ageable standards is ambiguous: it can refer either to the inputs 
or to the outputs of constitutional adjudication.82 
Many constitutional provisions—if viewed solely in light of 
text and history—would fail to qualify as judicially manageable 
standards in the input sense. Taken by themselves, they are too 
vague.83 Crucially, however, the modern Supreme Court, upon 
finding that a constitutional provision fails to furnish a judicially 
 
 78 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495. 
 79 See id at 2493, 2498–2506. 
 80 For discussion, see Richard H. Fallon Jr, Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv L Rev 1275, 1281–82 (2006). 
 81 See id at 1287–90. 
 82 See id at 1282–83 (defining a judicially manageable standard as an input when an 
existing standard is applied to a constitutional controversy, and as an output “in any case 
in which a court successfully devises a [new standard] that can thereafter be used to im-
plement a constitutional provision”). 
 83 See id at 1283 (“Viewed as an input in light of which a court might be asked to 
resolve constitutional cases, the bare language of the Equal Protection Clause is not a 
judicially manageable standard in political gerrymandering disputes.”). 
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manageable standard, does not typically conclude immediately 
that an issue is nonjusticiable. Instead, when confronted with 
troublingly underdeterminate inputs, the Court proceeds to a sec-
ond stage, in which it seeks to devise tests or formulae of the kind 
that dominate the landscape of modern constitutional law—a 
three-part test of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause,84 the “strict judicial scrutiny” formula for gauging the per-
missibility of infringements on fundamental rights,85 a plethora 
of standards for identifying violations of the free speech guaran-
tee,86 and so forth. In other words, when a constitutional provision 
is not a judicially manageable standard in the input sense, the 
Court assumes the partly creative, consequence-sensitive task of 
developing judicially manageable standards in the output sense.87 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion in Rucho illustrates the 
two-stage process, though in a context in which the second re-
sulted in failure. In appraising the challengers’ complaints under 
constitutional provisions that included the rights-conferring 
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment, the Chief 
Justice reviewed the efforts of the plaintiffs and then of the dis-
senting opinion to devise standards by which to identify constitu-
tionally impermissible partisan gerrymanders.88 Tellingly, he did 
not criticize efforts to fashion judicially manageable standards. 
Instead, he adjudged that those efforts fell short of success. If the 
Court were to wade into the political controversies in which adju-
dication of challenges to gerrymanders would enmesh it, he 
thought it “vital . . . that the Court act only in accord with espe-
cially clear standards”89 that he found lacking in the proposals 
that the plaintiffs and the dissenting justices advanced. 
Although much more might be said about the branch of the 
political question doctrine that involves an absence of judicially 
manageable standards, I venture only three brisk comments, all 
 
 84 See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 608 (2000) (noting that 
“modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has ‘identified three broad categories of activity 
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power’”), quoting United States v Lopez, 
514 US 549, 558 (1995). 
 85 On the historical emergence of strict judicial scrutiny, see generally Richard H. 
Fallon Jr, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L Rev 1267 (2007). 
 86 See, for example, Reed v Town of Gilbert, 135 S Ct 2218, 2226 (2015) (stating the 
relevant test for content-discriminatory regulations); Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 
447 (1969) (same with respect to incitements to violence); New York Times Co v Sullivan, 
376 US 254, 279–80 (1964) (same with respect to libel actions brought by public officials). 
 87 See Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev at 1281–97 (cited in note 80). 
 88 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2497–98. 
 89 Id at 2498. 
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related to the ultra vires dilemma and the complex jurisdictional 
issues that it highlights. First, the determination that the Su-
preme Court lacks jurisdiction based on an absence of judicially 
manageable standards can come only at the conclusion of a judi-
cial effort to devise judicially manageable standards in the output 
sense. If a political question ruling results in a dismissal for want 
of subject matter jurisdiction, it does not come until the Court in-
volves itself intently in a case not merely to determine what the 
parties have pleaded or proved, or even what the law establishes 
or requires, but also to attempt to craft judicially manageable 
standards. The Court’s initial engagement in the search for judi-
cially manageable standards—even if such standards do not per-
fectly reflect the Constitution’s “meaning”—testifies to the im-
portance of the judicial role in checking constitutional overreach 
by nonjudicial officials.90 
Second, there is a sense in which the judicial conclusion that 
judicially manageable standards are lacking represents a judicial 
failure: despite best efforts, the Supreme Court pronounces that 
it came up short in its effort to craft standards on which the en-
forcement of constitutional rights depends. To be sure, the Court 
views itself as subject to role-based constraints that dictate the 
embrace of failure under some circumstances.91 It would be ultra 
vires for the Court to establish rules of decision that were too far 
removed from the Constitution’s language, history, and ascertain-
able purposes. But the categorical determination that all chal-
lenges to partisan gerrymanders must be dismissed in all cases 
presents problems of its own. In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts did 
not attempt to prove an impossibility theorem or otherwise estab-
lish that the devising of judicially manageable standards was or 
would forever be impossible. Rather, although he did not say so 
expressly, the chief justice appears to have determined that the 
costs of allowing plaintiffs to keep on proposing new standards for 
gauging the permissibility of partisan gerrymanders were—pur-
suant to some undisclosed scale—not worth the benefits. It is not 
merely smart-alecky to observe that the Court has never articu-
lated judicially manageable second-order standards for determin-
ing when proposed first-order standards are judicially manageable. 
 
 90 See Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev at 1317 (cited in note 80) (emphasizing the existence 
of “permissible disparities between constitutional meaning and implementing doctrine”). 
 91 For further discussion, see notes 108, 197 and accompanying text. 
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Third, to enter into the domain of admittedly opinionated 
comment, I believe that Rucho’s analysis was mistaken for rea-
sons that attention to the ultra vires conundrum helps to high-
light. Although contemplating that the pursuit of partisan ad-
vantage in the drawing of district lines might in principle go too 
far and thereby violate constitutional norms, the Supreme Court 
held in Rucho that the judiciary could not identify and thus could 
not prohibit or remedy even ultra vires action along the dimen-
sion of merely excessive partisanship (that did not, for example, 
involve racial discrimination or an abridgment of one-person, one-
vote principles).92 Given the absence of reasonably clear second-
order standards for marking proposed first-order rules as judi-
cially manageable or not, one might expect the Court to exhibit 
special hesitation before concluding that the federal judiciary can-
not identify even the most egregious violations of constitutional 
norms by districting authorities. Instead, the Court bent, errone-
ously, in the opposite direction. 
In taking the anomalous step of dismissing a constitutional 
complaint as presenting a political question solely because it 
thought the task of identifying individual rights “beyond judicial 
capabilities,”93 Chief Justice Roberts—as I have noted—insisted 
that any judicially formulated test for identifying unconstitu-
tional partisan gerrymanders must be “especially clear.”94 A 
standard that would suffice as adequately judicially manageable 
under other circumstances would not do in Rucho, he implied, for 
reasons involving the need of the judiciary to maintain public 
trust in its nonpartisan character. Quoting Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy’s opinion in Vieth, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[w]ith 
uncertain limits [guiding judicial decision-making about when 
partisan gerrymandering went too far], intervening courts—even 
when proceeding with best intentions—would risk assuming po-
litical, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces 
ill will and distrust.”95 Chief Justice Roberts spoke even more ex-
plicitly in the oral argument in an earlier case, Gill v Whitford,96 
that the Court ultimately resolved on standing grounds. There, 
he worried aloud that adjudicating gerrymandering challenges 
 
 92 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2506–07. 
 93 Id at 2509 (Kagan dissenting). 
 94 Id at 2498 (majority). 
 95 Id, quoting Vieth, 541 US at 307 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). 
 96 138 S Ct 1916 (2018). 
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would entail courts “decid[ing] in every case whether the Demo-
crats win or the Republicans win.”97 Given that premise, he con-
jectured that if the courts became involved, “the intelligent man 
on the street is going to say [that if the Supreme Court rules for 
the Democrats] . . . [i]t must be because the Supreme Court pre-
ferred the Democrats over the Republicans.”98 If so, one could in-
fer, Chief Justice Roberts feared that “the intelligent man on the 
street” would lose respect for the Court. 
I do not question that it can sometimes be appropriate for the 
Supreme Court to take account of likely public perceptions in ap-
praising whether proposed standards are judicially manageable. 
But such considerations should matter only insofar as the Court 
can respond to them without defaulting on its more urgent re-
sponsibility to protect and promote—within bounds allowed by 
law—the moral and political legitimacy of the constitutional sys-
tem as a whole.99 As a property of both political regimes and judi-
cial decisions, moral legitimacy signifies entitlement to respect or 
obedience.100 It is an especially important concept under circum-
stances of political division. None of us can expect political insti-
tutions to reach decisions that we think are ideally just in all 
cases. In light of inevitable shortfall, moral legitimacy—or re-
spectworthiness—becomes the critical concept both in justifying 
the exercise of political power and in grounding claims of political 
obligation. 
Moral legitimacy can have multiple and diverse sources, in-
cluding substantive justice and procedural fairness.101 But few 
would deny that the moral legitimacy of constitutional govern-
ment in the United States depends vitally on wellsprings in polit-
ical democracy. In cases of reasonable disagreement, it is pre-
sumptively fair for the majority to rule. Even when we disagree, 
we can all understand why decisions reached through reasonably 
fair democratic processes have a presumptive claim to our respect 
and obedience. 
In my view, the Supreme Court majority in Rucho failed to 
reckon adequately with the threat that partisan gerrymandering 
 
 97 Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v Whitford, No 16-1161, *36–38 (US filed Oct 3, 2017). 
 98 Id at *38. 
 99 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court 41–46 
(Belknap 2018). 
 100 See id at 23. 
 101 See id at 29. 
2020] Political Questions and the Ultra Vires Conundrum 1505 
 
poses to the integrity and ultimately the moral legitimacy of 
American political democracy. As Justice Elena Kagan wrote: 
[T]he need for judicial review is at its most urgent in cases 
like these. “For here, politicians’ incentives conflict with vot-
ers’ interests, leaving citizens without any political remedy 
for their constitutional harms.” Those harms arise because 
politicians want to stay in office. No one can look to them for 
effective relief.102 
With regard to Chief Justice Roberts’s worries about the 
Court putting its sociological legitimacy at risk if the public per-
ceived it as taking sides between Democrats and Republicans, I 
further agree with Justice Kagan in sounding more paramount 
themes of legal and moral legitimacy: “Part of the Court’s role” in 
our system of government “is to defend [our democracy’s] founda-
tions” in a fair system of elections, even at the risk of some dam-
age to the Court’s institutional stature in the eyes of some.103 By 
forsaking the judicial role in upholding the democratic integrity 
of our electoral system, the Rucho Court erred grievously. 
* * * 
If one tries to tally the senses in which the various categories 
of political questions are jurisdictional in light of the ultra vires 
conundrum, two conclusions emerge. First, although all three of 
the categories of political questions that I have discussed in this 
Part are jurisdictional in one sense or another, the label of subject 
matter jurisdiction seems a bad fit, except possibly in cases in-
volving dismissal solely due to an absence of judicially managea-
ble standards. Otherwise, there is too much of a residual judicial 
role in implementing decisions made by other branches within the 
scope of their jurisdiction and in identifying and enforcing limits 
against ultra vires action by other branches, even in the pur-
ported exercise of their jurisdiction to resolve political questions. 
Second, because of the ultra vires conundrum, courts decid-
ing political question cases must nevertheless confront questions 
of jurisdiction in one or another sense of that sometimes chame-
leon-like term. In particular, the federal courts, centrally including 
the Supreme Court, inescapably need to gauge the outer limits of 
 
 102 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2523 (Kagan dissenting) (citation omitted), quoting Gill, 138 S 
Ct at 1941 (Kagan concurring). 
 103 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2525 (Kagan dissenting). 
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both their jurisdiction and that of other branches or institutions 
as defined by the concept of ultra vires action. 
III.  BASES FOR DENOMINATING QUESTIONS AS POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS: A PLURALISTIC ACCOUNT 
Justices, judges, and commentators have offered a variety of 
theories specifying proper grounds for identifying political ques-
tions, sometimes with the aim of rejecting bases that others have 
defended. This Part first examines the three leading theories—
which are conventionally labeled as classical, functional, and pru-
dential—of why and when the courts should determine that con-
stitutional disputes pose political questions. All have some reso-
nance in the doctrine, but none can explain everything, especially 
once the ultra vires conundrum and the various senses in which 
political question determinations can be jurisdictional come into 
the picture. Accordingly, without pretending to offer a full posi-
tive theory that would explain all decided cases, this Part 
sketches the outlines of a pluralistic account. 
A. The Classical Theory 
The classical theory holds that identifications of questions as 
political questions are continuous with, rather than deviations 
from, the ordinary processes of constitutional interpretation that 
more customarily result in rulings on the merits.104 Professor Her-
bert Wechsler offered the paradigmatic articulation of this theory: 
[A]ll the [political question] doctrine can defensibly imply is 
that the courts are called upon to judge whether the Consti-
tution has committed to another agency of government the 
autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that 
itself requires an interpretation.  
. . . 
[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention 
from decision is that the Constitution has committed the de-
termination of the issue to another agency of government 
than the courts. Difficult as it may be to make that judgment 
wisely, . . . what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional 
 
 104 See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 96 (Foundation 
2d ed 1988); Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 336 (cited in note 22). The recurrently cited 
sources for this view are Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 
11–14 (Harvard 1961), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1, 9 (1959). 
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interpretation, to be made and judged by standards that 
should govern the interpretive process generally. [That is to-
tally] different from a broad discretion to abstain or inter-
vene.105 
As thus formulated, the classical view has two defining ele-
ments. First, it rejects the notion—especially as associated with 
prudential theories, to be discussed below—that when identifying 
questions as political, courts assert an “extra-ordinary” discre-
tion106 to refuse to adjudicate disputes on grounds not explainable 
in terms of “neutral principles.”107 Second, the classical theory as-
sumes that courts in political question cases must adhere to con-
straints of judicial role that distinguish judicial from political, 
pragmatic, or expediently consequence-driven reasoning.108 
Framed in these terms, the classical view accepts that politi-
cal question determinations are jurisdictional in some sense of 
that term, identifying questions committed to other branches for 
ultimate resolution. In a possible exemplification, Justice Hugo 
Black’s concurring opinion in Coleman v Miller,109 which held that 
the questions whether a state could ratify a constitutional amend-
ment that it had previously rejected and whether a proposed 
amendment lapses if not ratified within a reasonable time were 
nonjusticiable political questions, reasoned that Article V grants 
Congress “exclusive power over the amending process.”110 The 
classical view is also compatible in principle with the result in 
Nixon, which holds that Article I, § 3, clause 6 gives the Senate 
sole authority to determine the procedural requisites of an im-
peachment trial.111 
By contrast, Rucho broke sharply with the classical theory by 
rejecting jurisdiction over a constitutional question, involving a 
claim of individual rights, that the Constitution does not assign 
to any other branch or institution via a textually demonstrable 
 
 105 Wechsler, 73 Harv L Rev at 7–9 (cited in note 104). 
 106 See Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 599 (cited in note 1) (contrasting “the ordinary respect 
of the courts for the substantive decisions of the political branches, and extra-ordinary 
deference to those branches’ determination that what they have done is constitutional”). 
 107 See Wechsler, 73 Harv L Rev at 19 (cited in note 104) (arguing that courts are 
restricted to deciding cases based on “reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved”). 
 108 See id at 14–15 (distinguishing the instrumental uses for which principles are dis-
played in political reasoning from the “neutral” testing and application of principles that 
should distinguish judicial reasoning). 
 109 307 US 433 (1939). 
 110 Id at 459 (Black concurring). 
 111 Nixon, 506 US at 229, 238. 
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commitment of authority for constitutional interpretation.112 A 
proponent of the classical theory might, of course, simply reject 
Rucho as wrongly decided. Even if so, the conjunction of Rucho 
with Nixon—which also highlights the central role that judicially 
manageable standards play in modern political question analy-
sis113—reveals a subtler but deeper challenge for the classical theory 
in the current day. That challenge is to give an account of where 
the boundaries of properly judicial reasoning—as distinguished 
from political, pragmatic, or prudential reasoning—lie. As I ex-
plained in Part II.C, judicial efforts to craft judicially manageable 
standards require a mix of pragmatic, predictive, and conse-
quence-sensitive reasoning that fits uneasily with classical as-
sumptions about role-based constraints on properly neutral and 
principled judicial reasoning. As judicial reasoning depends in-
creasingly heavily on what Baker v Carr referred to as “policy de-
termination[s],”114 efforts to constrain the judicial role by refer-
ence to a classical conception of judicial reasoning seem 
descriptively inadequate.115 
B. Functional Theories 
Functional theories emphasize comparative institutional 
competence and, in particular, call for judicial renunciation of  
decision-making authority in domains in which the courts would 
 
 112 Wechsler himself maintained that  
the power of Congress to “make or alter” state regulations of the “Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” implying as it does a power 
to draw district lines or to prescribe the standards to be followed in defining 
them, excludes the courts from passing on a constitutional objection to state ger-
rymanders, even if the Constitution can be thought to speak to this kind of 
inequality. 
Wechsler, 73 Harv L Rev at 8–9 (cited in note 104) (citations omitted). But this view has 
subsequently been rejected by a long line of cases, as Rucho recognized:  
Appellants suggest that, through the Elections Clause, the Framers set aside 
electoral issues such as the one before us as questions that only Congress can 
resolve. We do not agree. In two areas—one-person, one-vote and racial gerry-
mandering—our cases have held that there is a role for the courts with respect 
to at least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of congressional 
districts. 
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495–96 (citation omitted), citing Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964); 
Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993). 
 113 See Nixon, 506 US at 228–29 (noting that “the lack of judicially manageable stand-
ards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to 
a coordinate branch”). 
 114 Baker, 369 US at 217. 
 115 I say more about this difficulty in Part IV.A. 
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lack requisite information or skills, especially relative to some 
other institution.116 In modern cases, the Supreme Court most fa-
miliarly gestures toward the functional theory when it maintains 
that it lacks authority to decide questions for which no judicially 
manageable standards exist.117 Absent judicially manageable 
standards, courts could not adjudicate well and, accordingly, 
should vacate the field to institutions with greater presumptive 
competence. 
Recent cases, including Nixon and Rucho, have accorded 
great significance to the presence or absence of judicially manage-
able standards—sometimes in conjunction with evidence of tex-
tual commitments (as in Nixon)—and have thus suggested that 
the political question doctrine reflects functional considerations. 
Even so, functional competence all by itself cannot account for the 
existence and contents of the category of nonjusticiable political 
questions. Of foremost significance, functional competence is sel-
dom all-or-nothing. Accordingly, functional concerns can support 
more- and less-exacting standards of judicial review on the merits 
as readily as the classification of some questions as political ques-
tions that courts lack jurisdiction to resolve. For example, the Su-
preme Court typically insists that challenges to regulations of 
conduct within the military and prisons will receive only very def-
erential judicial review, due to the courts’ limited functional com-
petence, but not no judicial review at all.118 
The contrast between judicial deference in military and 
prison cases and the majority’s approach in Nixon and Rucho— 
both of which cited an absence of judicially manageable standards 
as a basis for eschewing judicial review altogether—raises ques-
tions on which the ultra vires conundrum sheds at least some 
 
 116 See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A 
Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L J 517, 566–97 (1966). 
 117 See, for example, Vieth, 541 US at 281 (Scalia) (plurality) (lamenting “[e]ighteen 
years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it”); Nixon, 506 US at 230 (con-
cluding that language in the Impeachment Trial Clause “lacks sufficient precision to afford 
any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions”). See generally Fal-
lon, 119 Harv L Rev 1275 (cited in note 80). 
 118 See, for example, Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 US 318, 326 (2012) 
(“The Court has confirmed the importance of deference to correctional officials and ex-
plained that a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld 
‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”), quoting Turner v Safley, 
482 US 78, 89 (1987); Chappell v Wallace, 462 US 296, 305 (1983) (“[C]ourts are ill-
equipped to determine the impact upon [military] discipline that any particular intrusion 
upon military authority might have.”), quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the 
Military, 37 NYU L Rev 181, 187 (1962). 
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light. As Justice Byron White emphasized in Nixon, the Senate 
may have broad discretion in determining what constitutes 
“try[ing]” impeachments, but the idea that there are no judicially 
manageable standards by which to conduct any judicial review 
whatsoever seems preposterous.119 Justice David Souter offered 
one such standard: whatever else the Senate may do, it must not 
decide by coin flip.120 Justice White similarly propounded the ex-
amples of a Senate judgment that an impeached official is simply 
“a bad guy”121 and of a practice “of automatically entering a judg-
ment of conviction whenever articles of impeachment” pass the 
House of Representatives.122 Although these proposed markers of 
bounds on Senate authority may seem caricatured, they show the 
ease with which the Supreme Court could have affirmed that the 
Senate’s constitutional determinations in conducting impeach-
ment trials were judicially reviewable, albeit subject to a highly 
deferential standard under which courts would rarely—if ever—
find constitutional violations. 
Functional considerations could also have supported alterna-
tive approaches in Rucho, not just the one that the Court adopted. 
Following the model of Justices White and Souter in Nixon, the 
Rucho Court could have found no constitutional violation on the 
merits, but without pronouncing categorically that all challenges 
to partisan gerrymanders are nonjusticiable. Alternatively, the 
Court could have adapted the approach that Justice Kennedy em-
ployed in an opinion concurring in the judgment in Vieth. 
Whereas Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion would have pro-
nounced categorically that when gerrymanders go “too far” is a 
political question,123 Justice Kennedy held, more narrowly, that 
although the plaintiffs had failed to articulate a judicially man-
ageable standard under which they deserved to prevail, the pos-
sibility could not be foreclosed that other challengers in another 
case could establish a constitutional violation by producing a test 
fitted to the facts of their case.124 
Nor should we necessarily accept that functional considera-
tions dictated that the Rucho plaintiffs had to lose. Even taking 
functional considerations into account, the Court could have ruled 
 
 119 Nixon, 506 US at 246–47 (White concurring in the judgment). See also Tushnet, 
80 NC L Rev at 1210–11 (cited in note 58). 
 120 Nixon, 506 US at 253–54 (Souter concurring in the judgment). 
 121 Id at 239 (White concurring in the judgment) (quotation marks omitted). 
 122 Id at 246. 
 123 Veith, 541 US at 291 (Scalia) (plurality).  
 124 See id at 308–11 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). 
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for the challengers in Rucho even without propounding a gener-
ally applicable judicially manageable standard. Ironically, Chief 
Justice Roberts supplied a model for analysis along these lines in 
his opinion for the Court in National Federation of Independent 
Businesses v Sebelius125 (NFIB). Among the issues in NFIB was 
whether Congress overreached its powers under the Spending 
Clause when it dictated that states must either expand their Med-
icaid programs or forfeit all Medicaid funds.126 As established by 
prior cases, a mandate of that kind was constitutionally imper-
missible if coercive.127 In finding the challenged mandate coercive 
and therefore invalid, Chief Justice Roberts did not purport to ad-
vance a judicially manageable standard for identifying coercive 
exercises of the Spending Clause. “It is enough for today that 
wherever [the] line may be” between constitutionally permissible 
inducement and constitutionally forbidden coercion, “this statute 
is surely beyond it,” he wrote.128 
Dissenting in Rucho, Justice Kagan—whose analytical ap-
proach I applauded above—would have followed a variant of that 
model. Wherever the line lay between constitutionally acceptable 
and constitutionally excessive partisan gerrymanders, she 
thought that the Court could have described the facts of the case 
in full detail and concluded as “a first-cut answer [to the ‘how 
much is too much’ question]: This much is too much.”129 
Overall, I do not question that functional concerns are signif-
icant to the identification of political questions. Nevertheless, 
functional criteria seem incapable of explaining when and why 
the Court should prefer the denomination of questions as political 
to the application of highly deferential standards of on-the-merits 
review. 
C. Prudential Theories 
In contrast with both classical and functional theories, pru-
dential theories insist that the political question doctrine involves 
ad hoc judgments rooted in expediency, not “principled” determi-
nations of textual commitment or generalizable assessments of 
 
 125 567 US 519 (2012). 
 126 Id at 542. 
 127 Id at 575–80 (Roberts) (plurality). 
 128 Id at 585. 
 129 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2521 (Kagan dissenting). 
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functional competence.130 Professor Alexander Bickel provided the 
archetypal articulation of a prudential approach: 
[O]nly by means of a play on words can the broad discretion 
that the courts have in fact exercised be turned into an act of 
constitutional interpretation governed by the general stand-
ards of the interpretive process. The political-question doc-
trine simply resists being domesticated in this fashion. There 
is . . . something different about it, in kind not in degree; 
something greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not 
construction and not principle. And it is something that can-
not exist within the four corners of Marbury v. Madison. 
. . . 
 Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the 
political-question doctrine: the Court’s sense of lack of capac-
ity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the 
issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the 
sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial 
judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judg-
ment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not 
be; (d) finally (“in a mature democracy”), the inner vulnera-
bility, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally ir-
responsible and has no earth to draw strength from.131 
 
Although no modern Supreme Court decisions rest on irre-
ducibly prudential reasoning of the kind that Bickel championed, 
a fair characterization of the themes that run through and help 
to explain the Court’s political question decisions over time could 
not wholly exclude reference to Bickelian prudentialism. Justices 
Souter, Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor have all written either con-
curring or dissenting opinions in which they echoed concerns of 
 
 130 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics 125–26, 184 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962). See also Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial 
Self-Limitation, 37 Harv L Rev 338, 344–45 (1924) (citations omitted): 
[The political question doctrine] applies to all those matters of which the court, 
at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take 
jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the 
vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail. Some-
times it will result from the feeling that the court is incompetent to deal with 
the particular type of question involved. Sometimes it will be induced by the 
feeling that the matter is “too high” for the courts. But always there will be a 
weighing of considerations in the scale of political wisdom. 
 131 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 125–26, 184 (cited in note 130). 
2020] Political Questions and the Ultra Vires Conundrum 1513 
 
the kind that Bickel articulated, even if only in modulated form. 
In Zivotofsky, in which the Court rejected political question objec-
tions in holding that the federal courts could determine the con-
stitutionality of a statute requiring the State Department to list 
“Israel” as the place of birth on the passports of Americans born 
in Jerusalem, Justice Breyer dissented in light of “prudential con-
siderations.”132 Among them, he cited the potential foreign policy 
ramifications of having US passports denominate Jerusalem as 
part of Israel when Jerusalem’s status is a subject of international 
contention.133 Justice Sotomayor concurred in the majority’s dis-
position of Zivotofsky, but she wrote separately to emphasize that 
in “rare case[s]” the Court should find questions nonjusticiable 
based principally on prudential grounds.134 Justice Souter 
sounded similar themes in his concurring opinion in Nixon.135 Jus-
tice Lewis Powell also affirmed his view that “the political-ques-
tion doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns” in his concur-
ring statement in Goldwater v Carter.136 
Accordingly, a justice who wanted to characterize a question 
as political based on largely ad hoc, prudential considerations 
could find bases within existing law on which to do so. In taking 
that stand, a justice would need to claim a robust, discretionary 
power to identify limits on judicial jurisdiction. But prudential 
theories of the political question distinguish themselves by insist-
ing that such a power exists. 
Nevertheless, it is nearly self-evident that the prudential 
theory cannot account for all of the decided cases any more than 
the classical and functional theories can. To cite just one example, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon, which cited a “textually 
demonstrable commitment” of judicially unreviewable authority 
to the Senate and involved the removal from office of a largely 
unknown federal judge, does not fit the mold.137 Nothing momen-
tous was at stake. No case-specific exigency impelled the Justices 
to decide as they did. Although the Court anticipated that a pres-
idential impeachment might raise prudential considerations, its 
ruling swept more broadly. 
 
 132 Zivotofsky, 566 US at 213 (Breyer dissenting). 
 133 Id at 216–18. 
 134 Id at 207 (Sotomayor concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 135 Nixon, 506 US at 252–54 (Souter concurring in the judgment). 
 136 444 US 996, 1000 (1979) (Powell concurring in the judgment to grant, vacate, and 
remand the case with directions to dismiss). 
 137 Nixon, 506 US at 229. 
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D. The Need for a Nonexclusive Theory 
From the individual inadequacies of the classical, functional, 
and prudential theories to explain all aspects of the political doc-
trine, a relatively straightforward conclusion follows: any descrip-
tively adequate explanation of when, why, and how the Supreme 
Court applies the political question doctrine would need to in-
clude a mix of elements. It is a partly distinct question whether 
judicial practice that relies on combined aspects of the classical, 
functional, and prudential theories can be justified as a matter of 
law and judicial-role morality. I believe that the answer is yes, 
provided that elements of the classical, functional, and prudential 
theories are combined properly. 
1. Descriptive analysis. 
The failure of the Supreme Court to choose decisively among 
the classical, functional, and prudential conceptions of the politi-
cal question doctrine should be acknowledged on all sides. The 
justices continue to rely on themes from all of the theories, despite 
the claims of their proponents that they are distinct and some-
times irreconcilable alternatives. Insofar as the classical theory 
can stand independently of functional and prudential theories, it 
seems to provide the best account of the important doctrinal 
strand involving textually demonstrable commitment of issues to 
nonjudicial decision-makers. Yet the classical theory fails to pro-
vide a convincing explanation of political question reasoning that 
turns on the presence or absence of judicially manageable stand-
ards, especially once the judicial role in devising judicially man-
ageable standards is brought into view. By contrast, although 
functional theories can partly—but only partly—explain the as-
pect of political question analysis that focuses on judicially man-
ageable standards, inquiries into textually demonstrable commit-
ments hinge centrally, even if not exclusively, on other kinds of 
considerations. And prudential theories, though inadequate if of-
fered as attempts to explain the entirety of the political question 
doctrine, seem to capture some strains of political question rea-
soning distinctively well. 
In addition, there is no good reason to try to keep the leading 
theories hermetically sealed off from one another. The Supreme 
Court’s Nixon opinion included a compendium of partly overlap-
ping rationales—and, in my view, wisely so. Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist thus buttressed his conclusion that Article I, § 3, 
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clause 6 constituted a textually demonstrable commitment of ju-
risdiction to the Senate by reasoning that there were no judicially 
manageable standards for determining whether the Senate had 
properly tried Chief Judge Nixon.138 In addition, the Court cited 
prudential factors that would counsel urgently against judicial re-
view of an impeachment and conviction of the president, should 
one ever occur: 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that opening the door of 
judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying 
impeachments would “expose the political life of the country 
to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.” This lack of finality 
would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were 
impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence his 
effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while 
the judicial process was running its course, but during any 
retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if 
its first judgment of conviction were invalidated.139 
The Court’s opinion in Rucho proceeded along similar lines. 
Chief Justice Roberts blended functionalist arguments about the 
absence of judicially manageable standards with reasoning that 
emphasized the hazards of judicial intervention in a redistricting 
“process that often produces ill will and distrust.”140 The latter 
strand in the Court’s analysis had quasi-prudential aspects, 
though it was framed in generalized terms, not presented as the 
kind of ad hoc discretionary judgment that Bickel thought inca-
pable of being “domesticated” within ordinary legal reasoning.141 
2. Jurisprudential foundations. 
If there is any valid objection to combination of the functional 
and prudential with the classical theory of the political question 
doctrine, it would need to hold that judges should not rely on con-
siderations that they sometimes, perhaps frequently, have relied 
on in the past. The most powerful challenge of this kind emanates 
from the classical theory’s two defining elements: its insistence 
that courts must adhere to legal norms that define obligations of 
the judicial role and that they must eschew exercises of judicial 
 
 138 See id at 228–29. 
 139 See id at 236 (citation omitted). 
 140 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2498, quoting Vieth, 541 US at 307 (Kennedy concurring in the 
judgment). 
 141 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 125 (cited in note 130). 
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discretion that lack legal authorization. Each of these tenets 
might appear in tension with functional theories, prudential ap-
proaches, or both. 
The best response begins with acceptance of the premise that 
judges and justices have a role-based obligation to obey the law 
and thus to accede to legal constraints on their authority, even 
when identifying political questions. But, having accepted that 
premise, I would insist that the law, properly understood, does 
not preclude reliance on functional and prudential considerations 
in the way that Professor Wechsler and other traditional propo-
nents of the classical model assumed. 
We can best understand the political question doctrine by sit-
uating the Constitution and the role of the Article III judiciary 
within a practice-based theory of law. According to practice-based 
theories, the foundations of law lie in acceptance. For example, 
the Constitution is law, not because the Framers commanded that 
it should be, but because relevant constituencies living in the pre-
sent accept it as such.142 To refer to the practices of acceptance 
that constitute a legal system, Professor Hart introduced the term 
“rule of recognition.”143 As others have emphasized, the term 
“rule” may seem too quasi-algorithmic to capture the complex 
practices of judges and other officials in identifying and applying 
the law.144 But the underlying idea, which conveys a deep insight, 
holds that for a legal system to exist, judges and other officials 
must share criteria of legal validity. According to Hart, the rule 
of recognition in all functioning legal systems exists as a matter 
of social fact and is fixed by “the law-identifying and law-applying 
operations of the courts.”145 
As applied to the United States, the Hartian framework ex-
plains how the Constitution came to be law in the 1780s, despite 
 
 142 See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 87–92 (cited in note 99). 
 143 See Hart, Concept of Law at 94–95, 100–10, 116, 256 (cited in note 18). 
 144 See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in San-
ford Levinson, ed, Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional 
Amendment 145, 150 (Princeton 1995) (emphasis in original): 
There is no reason to suppose that the ultimate source of law need be anything 
that looks at all like a rule, whether simple or complex, or even a collection of 
rules, and it may be less distracting to think of the ultimate source of recognition 
. . . as a practice. 
 145 Hart, Concept of Law at 256 (cited in note 18). See also id at 116 (asserting that 
the “rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and [the legal system’s] 
rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards 
of official behaviour by its officials”). 
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being discontinuous with prior law. The Hartian framework also 
elucidates why a variety of extraconstitutional rules of interpre-
tation are also law.146 For example, the justices seem to adhere to 
a rule or standard under which judicial precedents sometimes 
control subsequent constitutional interpretation, especially if 
they have generated weighty reliance interests, even if they devi-
ate from the Constitution’s original meaning.147 Plainly, however, 
any effort to conceptualize American constitutional practice in 
Hartian terms must postulate that the rule of recognition that 
prevails in the Supreme Court is underdeterminate in important 
respects. No other plausible explanation can account for recurrent 
divisions among the justices, some of which reflect moral or policy 
disagreements. Taking note of this phenomenon, Professor Jules 
Coleman has maintained that in reasonably disputable cases, the 
judicial practices that fix the rule of recognition function less as a 
determinant of uniquely correct decisions than as a conventional 
“framework for bargaining.”148 
The vagueness or underdeterminacy of the rule of recognition 
provides crucial background for understanding the status of the 
political question doctrine. Such a doctrine exists. It is defined 
and limited by norms of legal obligation and judicial role that con-
strain and sometimes mandate the exercise of judicial power. But 
the pertinent norms, as rooted in judicial practice and judges’ self-
understanding of their role-based obligations, are vague in some 
respects, and they do not categorically rule out judicial reliance 
on functional and prudential considerations in weighing invoca-
tion of the political question doctrine. 
In relying on judicial practice to vindicate judicial weighing 
of functional and prudential considerations in identifying politi-
cal questions, I acknowledge that Hart did not equate the law 
with whatever a court—including our Supreme Court—might do 
or assert in particular cases. To the contrary, he maintained that 
courts, including highest courts, could violate the rule of recogni-
tion.149 Nevertheless, in maintaining that judges and justices vio-
late the law by taking functional and prudential considerations 
into account in political question and other cases, proponents of 
 
 146 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of 
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 NC L Rev 1107, 1122–32 (2008). 
 147 See id. 
 148 See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Ap-
proach to Legal Theory 100 (Oxford 2001). 
 149 See Hart, Concept of Law at 145 (cited in note 18) (insisting that rules supply 
“standards of correct judicial decision” that courts “are not free to disregard”). 
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the classical theory would need to insist that the judges and jus-
tices who do so have misunderstood the implications of some fun-
damental legal rule that is either validated by practice or directly 
traceable to a rule that is. So far, proponents of the classical the-
ory have failed to meet that burden. Their position, moreover, is 
rendered increasingly implausible by widespread acceptance of 
functional and prudential judicial reasoning not only in political 
question analysis, but also in reasoning on the merits of disputed 
cases. I discuss the overlap between judicial reasoning in political 
question and merits analysis in Part IV.A. 
Professor Bickel had a subtly different reason for affirming 
that the prudential theory of the political question doctrine could 
not be reconciled with the classical model. He insisted that the 
political question doctrine was different “in kind not in degree” 
from other legal doctrines and that it “cannot exist within the four 
corners of Marbury v. Madison.”150 As reflection on that formula-
tion suggests, Bickel’s claims about the nature of the political 
question doctrine were at best enigmatic. I am not sure what it 
would mean for the political question doctrine or any other doc-
trine to “exist within the four corners of Marbury.” More im-
portant, Bickel’s stance was paradoxical. Although he implied 
that the political question doctrine was somehow extralegal, his 
argument was at bottom a legal argument about the criteria for 
the appropriate application of a legal doctrine. He did not deny 
that the political question doctrine exists as a matter of law. Nor 
did he deny that judges could misapply it as a matter of law—for 
example, by denominating questions as political whenever judges 
disliked the parties for whom they would be obliged to rule if they 
decided a case on the merits. 
Modern justices who have echoed Bickel in emphasizing the 
prudential aspect of the political question doctrine have therefore 
rightly retained Bickel’s core insight that prudential considera-
tions sometimes properly matter while abandoning his paradoxi-
cal insistence that the political question doctrine is extralegal. 
Where courts have prudential reasons to invoke the political 
question doctrine, they can and should cite those reasons as 
grounds for their decision. 
Judicial reliance on functional reasons for invoking the polit-
ical question doctrine should be tested, and frequently accepted, 
on the same terms. Within the law-defined limits of the judicial 
 
 150 Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 125–26 (cited in note 130). 
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role, judges are often (though not always) justified in basing their 
decisions on functional considerations, including in political ques-
tion cases. 
In short, the political question doctrine can and does combine 
elements modeled by the classical, functional, and prudential 
theories. The one strong condition for successful reconciliation of 
the theories is that functional and prudential reasoning are per-
missible only insofar as authorized by law. Although strong in one 
sense, that condition is of course debatable in its application to 
some cases. As I have emphasized, any practice-based jurispru-
dential theory must acknowledge that the rule of recognition is 
vague or underdeterminate in some important respects. That 
said, it is past time to recognize that the classical, functional, and 
prudential theories all play legally permissible roles in the shap-
ing and application of the political question doctrine. 
IV.  EXPLAINING THE NARROWNESS OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE, BUT ALSO ITS PERSISTENCE 
This Part explores two puzzles about the political question 
doctrine that form mirror images of one another. The first in-
volves the infrequency with which the Supreme Court invokes the 
political question doctrine. Rucho furnishes an important recent 
data point, which must be accounted for, but it is an anomaly. 
Given the broad range of considerations that can support the 
identification of political questions, one might expect the doctrine 
to have a capacious reach. Yet Rucho is only the third majority 
opinion since the 1930s to find that a case poses a nonreviewable 
political question. Why? 
The first two Sections of this Part answer that question by 
offering paired explanations, both of which emerge from the ultra 
vires conundrum. First, the reasons that would support the de-
nomination of an issue as a political question can most often be 
recast as reasons to deny relief on the merits, and the substantive 
rejection of a plaintiff’s claim will typically have nearly the same 
practical effects as a dismissal on political question grounds. Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court most frequently prefers not to signal its 
jurisdictionally based incapacity to function as the ultimate con-
stitutional expositor in all cases. Among other reasons for the 
Court not to advertise limits on its jurisdiction to resolve consti-
tutional issues in otherwise justiciable cases, such advertise-
ments would invite attention to the ultra vires conundrum that 
would materialize if another institution were to insist that the 
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Court, in a particular case, had acted ultra vires. Once the possi-
bility of ultra vires judicial action is highlighted, a question might 
follow that the Court understandably would prefer to see un-
asked: If the Supreme Court claims to be the ultimate authority 
on constitutionally intra and ultra vires action, including its own, 
who will guard the guardians? 
The limited range of the political question doctrine frames 
the puzzle that the third Section of this Part addresses: Why does 
the modern Supreme Court retain the political question doctrine 
at all? On this point, the evidence from Nixon and Rucho speaks 
unequivocally. Political question rulings, I argue, send a stronger 
signal than on-the-merits dismissals of judicial commitment to 
avoid oversight of another branch of government in future cases. 
They also further distance the Court from approving decisions by 
the political branches that the justices decline to countermand. 
While the Court normally prefers not to disavow all oversight, the 
political question doctrine permits it to communicate singularly 
unmistakable messages that responsibility for some ultimate de-
cisions lies elsewhere. 
A. The Overlap of Political Question Reasoning and Merits 
Reasoning 
Almost without exception, the considerations that would sup-
port a determination that a case poses a political question are 
equally at home in judicial reasoning about appropriate outcomes 
on the merits.151 To frame the point in light of the ultra vires co-
nundrum, the distinction between on-the-merits review and judi-
cial oversight only to redress ultra vires action blurs at the edges, 
where highly deferential substantive review may have little more 
practical bite than judicial inquiry into whether another institu-
tion has acted ultra vires.152 Under these circumstances, it should 
 
 151 See Zivotofsky, 566 US at 198, 201 (noting that the respondent’s merits arguments 
“reprise[d]” her arguments that the case presented a political question and concluding that 
“[r]ecitation of these arguments—which sound in familiar principles of constitutional in-
terpretation—is enough to establish that this case does not ‘turn on standards that defy 
judicial application’”); Tushnet, 80 NC L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 58) (contending that 
“in a world where the Court is comfortable with interpreting the Constitution and uncom-
fortable with allowing anyone else to do so, once it is conceded that a provision means 
something, the ‘textually demonstrable commitment’ element simply falls away.”); Hen-
kin, 85 Yale L J at 605 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the Baker factors “seem rather to be 
elements of the ordinary respect which the courts show to the substantive decisions of the 
political branches”). 
 152 The tendency of the distinction to blur at the edges is illustrated in the history of 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, where “decisional law, especially in recent times, has stretched 
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occasion no surprise that the kinds of reasons that would lead to 
deferential review are normally indistinguishable from those that 
could be adduced to identify a nonjusticiable political question. 
Nor should it be a shock that the Supreme Court would prefer to 
define the limits of its capacity to review and revise other institu-
tions’ constitutional determinations in nonjurisdictional terms. 
The conclusion that the Supreme Court reasons identically in 
identifying political questions and issuing merits rulings consti-
tutes a defining tenet of the classical theory of the political ques-
tion doctrine. As I emphasized, however, the classical theory in-
sists that considerations involving the judicial role impose sharp 
limits on the factors that courts can take into account when de-
ciding constitutional cases on the merits.153 By contrast, the mod-
ern Court takes it for granted that textual and historical indicia 
of constitutional meaning sometimes require supplementation by 
functional, prudential, and other instrumental factors to yield 
sound and determinate conclusions.154 As the range of considera-
tions that courts can evaluate broadens, the classical theory loses 
its bite. Functional and prudential analysis that the classical the-
ory sought to minimize or exclude now feature as prominently in 
merits reasoning as in identification of political questions. 
Nixon exemplifies the blurring of boundaries. As Justice 
White emphasized in concurrence, Articles I and II abound with 
delegations of authority to Congress and the president.155 In 
nearly all cases challenging the exercise of congressional and 
presidential authority, courts therefore must engage in line draw-
ing, if not to mark the boundaries of another branch’s judicially 
unreviewable authority, then to determine the substantive limits 
of constitutionally permissible but judicially reviewable action.156 
In other words, as the ultra vires problem highlights, courts must 
almost always decide whether Congress or the president over-
stepped constitutional bounds. The disputed issue in political 
question cases typically involves the proper characterization of 
 
the notion of jurisdiction, thereby making it difficult at times to distinguish jurisdiction 
from the legal merits.” Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler at 1238 (cited in note 72). 
 153 See Part III.A. 
 154 See, for example, David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U Chi 
L Rev 190, 208 (1988) (“Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the 
courts must be authorized—indeed, required—to consider their own, and the other 
branches’, limitations and propensities when they construct doctrine to govern future 
cases.”); Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev at 1285–97 (cited in note 80). 
 155 See Nixon, 506 US at 240–42 (White concurring in the judgment). 
 156 See Part I. 
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the bounds that the courts first must identify and then police: Are 
they the bounds of another branch’s judicially unreviewable au-
thority, or are they the criteria by which courts identify constitu-
tional error in a domain in which another branch’s decisions are 
judicially reviewable? 
Rucho, in which the Court declined to find that the Constitu-
tion vested another branch with ultimate authority to interpret a 
controverted provision, is admittedly a partial anomaly. It con-
templates no judicial review of legislative discretion in drawing 
district lines along a single, identified dimension, involving no 
constitutional offense other than partisan advantage seeking, 
even on the assumption that the legislature goes too far. Yet even 
Rucho highlights the inescapable judicial responsibility for con-
stitutional line drawing along other dimensions, even when chal-
lengers object to a gerrymander enacted to aid one political party 
and harm another. In particular, the majority opinion expressly 
recognized that the prerogative of legislatures to engage in parti-
san gerrymandering is bounded by a judicially enforceable prohi-
bition against racial vote dilution and a demand for adherence to 
the one-person, one-vote requirement.157 
Moreover, whether the Supreme Court characterizes the 
rules that it enforces as bounding a judicially nonreviewable ju-
risdiction or as substantive restrictions on judicially reviewable 
decision-making, the Court must devise the tests that it applies.158 
And when the Court does so, functional and prudential considera-
tions that once were thought to be the hallmarks of political ques-
tion reasoning frequently exert a large influence. 
Commerce Clause doctrine furnishes an example. As much as 
the Impeachment Trial Clause, the Commerce Clause is a textual 
assignment of authority to another branch.159 One could, accord-
ingly, imagine an argument that questions arising from Con-
gress’s exercise of powers under the Commerce Clause are judi-
cially unreviewable political questions. Indeed, historical 
experience might have pointed the Supreme Court toward that 
approach. In the period leading up to the Court’s famous “switch 
 
 157 See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495–96. 
 158 See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 26–44 (cited in note 99). 
 159 See US Const Art I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
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in time [that] save[d] nine” in 1937,160 the Court had tried to for-
mulate tests that significantly circumscribed Congress’s regula-
tory powers. But the effort proved unsuccessful by a variety of 
standards. When the Court reconsidered its standards for gaug-
ing congressional power under the Commerce Clause in the late 
1930s and early 1940s, it gave Congress so much latitude that 
Justice Robert Jackson, in private correspondence, expressed 
doubt that the Court could ever again invalidate a regulatory 
statute.161 
Yet the Court, in rendering its crucial rulings in the 1930s 
and 1940s, never described questions about Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority as political questions. Instead, from then 
through the current day, it has consistently assumed that chal-
lenges to the exercise of Congress’s power are justiciable, even 
though challenges to the regulation of private actors never suc-
ceeded in the Supreme Court in the nearly sixty years prior to the 
Court’s 1995 decision in United States v Lopez.162 
In the view of some commentators, the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority163 
effectively pushed one set of Commerce Clause questions into the 
political question category.164 Garcia involved a challenge to con-
gressional regulation of the wages and hours of local government 
employees.165 Framed broadly, the question before the Court was 
 
 160 See Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 135 (Doubleday, Doran 
& Co 1938). 
 161 See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitu-
tional Revolution 221 (Oxford 1998) (“If we were to be brutally frank . . . I suspect what 
we would say is that in any case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate 
commerce, the Court will accept that judgment.”), quoting Letter from Robert Jackson to 
Sherman Minton (Dec 21, 1942). 
 162 514 US 549 (1995). National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976), found 
limitations on Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate state and local 
governments in the performance of traditional governmental functions vital to their integ-
rity, but the Court reversed that decision less than a decade later in Garcia v San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985). 
 163 469 US 528 (1985). 
 164 See, for example, Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 308–10 (cited in note 22) (arguing 
that “the Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause tracks the rise and fall of the political 
question doctrine” and citing the example of Garcia); Redish, 79 Nw U L Rev at 1057–59 
(cited in note 1) (suggesting that the Court “employ[ed] some of [the political question 
doctrine’s] precepts” in Garcia), citing Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National 
Political Process (Chicago 1980); Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional 
Law, 88 Mich L Rev 49, 58–59 (1989) (contending that Garcia “can be understood as adopt-
ing the view that objections to federal legislation on the ground that it intrudes on consti-
tutionally protected domains of the states raise political questions”). 
 165 See Garcia, 469 US at 532–35. 
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whether there are judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state and local 
governments.166 In response, the Court held that when Congress 
validly regulates private parties, it may regulate state and local 
governments on the same basis, federalism-based concerns to the 
contrary notwithstanding.167 In so ruling, Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court spoke in terms familiar in po-
litical question analysis. The Constitution, he affirmed, confers 
authority to decide whether state and local governments should 
be exempted from federal regulation to Congress, not the 
courts.168 The Constitution’s assignment of this power should oc-
casion neither surprise nor alarm, Justice Blackmun reasoned. 
“It is no novelty,” he wrote, “to observe that the composition of the 
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the 
States from overreaching by Congress,” including through the 
equal representation of states in the Senate.169 With regard to ju-
dicial power, Justice Blackmun also professed “doubt that courts 
ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on 
the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States 
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”170 
Nevertheless, the Court cast its ruling as one on the merits. 
The Court has followed similar trains of reasoning in a myr-
iad of cases in which constitutional allocations of power to Con-
gress and the executive have profound implications for constitu-
tional rights. Even when upholding broad official discretion, 
traceable to textually demonstrable grants of authority, the Court 
would rarely think it appropriate to characterize claims of indi-
vidual rights as presenting political questions, no matter how def-
erential its standards of review might be. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s reasoning often closely tracks the rhetoric of political 
question analysis in combining reliance on a constitutional as-
signment of power to nonjudicial institutions with recognition of 
 
 166 Id at 537. 
 167 See id at 547–57. 
 168 See id at 552: 
[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on 
federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National 
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal 
authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by proce-
dural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judi-
cially created limitations on federal power. 
 169 Garcia, 469 US at 550–51. 
 170 Id at 548. 
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functional or prudential limits on the courts’ capacity to craft ju-
dicially manageable standards. Cases involving deference to the 
military and to prison officials exemplify the pattern.171 As the 
Court explained in Chappell v Wallace,172 “courts are ill-equipped 
to determine the impact upon [military] discipline that any par-
ticular intrusion upon military authority might have.”173 Simi-
larly, functional considerations underlie the Court’s approach to 
complaints about the exercise of official discretion in prison 
cases.174 
Prudential considerations—which are not always sharply 
distinguishable from reasons involving the courts’ lack of func-
tional capacity to make good decisions in categories of cases with 
potentially momentous consequences—also exert widespread in-
fluences on judicial decision-making in cases outside the political 
question doctrine. It is hornbook law that courts of equity must 
balance public and private interests before issuing injunctions.175 
Accordingly, as Professor Louis Henkin persuasively argued, a 
number of the Supreme Court’s political question holdings could 
be recast as decisions about the inappropriateness of requested 
 
 171 For critical analysis of relevant doctrine, generally arguing that the Court’s deci-
sions are undertheorized, see Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Consti-
tutional Decision Making, 98 Iowa L Rev 465, 485–92 (2013). 
 172 462 US 296 (1983). 
 173 Id at 305, quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 NYU L Rev 
181, 187 (1962) (quotation marks omitted). 
 174 See Shaw v Murphy, 532 US 223, 229–30 (2001) (rejecting a claim that inmates 
have a First Amendment right to give legal advice to other inmates and noting that “courts 
are particularly ‘ill equipped’ to deal with [the] problems” of prisons), quoting Procunier v 
Martinez, 416 US 396, 404–05 (1974); O’Lone v Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342, 349–50, 
353 (1987) (noting the courts’ lack of institutional competence and applying Turner v 
Safley, 482 US 78 (1987), to reject a free exercise challenge to prison regulations); Turner, 
482 US at 84–85, 89 (establishing a relaxed standard of review in light of courts’ relative 
lack of expertise in prison administration and separation-of-powers concerns). See also 
Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 Fed Sent Rptr 245, 246 (2012) 
(observing that “it is a rare case decided under Turner in which the plaintiff ultimately 
prevails”). 
 175  Under the traditional balance-of-equities test, a federal court will not issue a per-
manent injunction unless the plaintiff can demonstrate:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not 
be disserved by a permanent injunction. 
eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006). 
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equitable relief in light of the balance of public and private inter-
ests.176 Among his examples he listed Gilligan v Morgan, in which 
the plaintiffs requested an injunction that would have entailed 
ongoing judicial oversight of the organization, training, and de-
ployment of the Ohio National Guard.177 However one judges the 
result in Gilligan, it is indisputable that courts weigh prudential 
considerations in determining whether and how to frame equita-
ble decrees. 
As recently as in Baker v Carr, the Supreme Court credited 
the idea that questions were political if they required policy-based 
discretionary judgments.178 Today, discretionary, policy-based 
reasoning has become commonplace in constitutional cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court. 
B. The Typical Dispreference for Invoking the Political 
Question Doctrine 
With “ordinary” judicial reasoning involving considerations 
that once might have seemed more political than judicial, Su-
preme Court decisions to invoke the political question doctrine 
mostly reflect legally unforced choices. Moreover, as the rarity of 
political question holdings illustrates, the Court almost invaria-
bly prefers to cast its decisions as resolving disputes on the mer-
its. To explain the Court’s characteristic preference for framing 
its decisions in merits rather than political question terms, I 
would offer three conjectures, all related to the signal that a deci-
sion to invoke the political question doctrine sends. 
First, the Supreme Court hesitates to mark issues as outside 
its jurisdiction because of a belief among the justices that the 
Court’s availability to resolve constitutional disputes is crucial to 
the successful operation of the American constitutional order.179 
Quite simply, the justices do not trust other branches of govern-
ment to behave responsibly. Professor Pamela Karlan has written 
of the modern Court’s “disdain” for Congress.180 Whether or not 
 
 176 Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 617–22 (cited in note 1). 
 177 See id at 619–22. 
 178 Baker, 369 US at 217 (suggesting that some cases may be nonjusticiable because 
of “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion”). 
 179 See, for example, Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 317 (cited in note 22) (suggesting 
that “[t]he political question doctrine cannot coexist with the current Court’s view of the 
judiciary’s place in the constitutional structure”). 
 180 Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 Harv L Rev 1, 41–55 (2012). 
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that term is apt, insofar as the Founding generation looked to 
Congress to check constitutional overreach by the executive 
branch, the rise of political parties has upset their plan. Congress 
rarely asserts its prerogatives to thwart action in excess of juris-
diction by a president of the same party.181 Congress’s unreliabil-
ity as a guardian of constitutional norms may encourage the 
Court to regard judicial review as indispensable. 
Even apart from negative attitudes toward other branches, 
the Court has a lofty assessment of its own competence and of the 
trust the American people have in it.182 In Cooper v Aaron,183 the 
Court declared it to be a “basic principle” of our constitutional or-
der “that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the 
law of the Constitution.”184 The Court has also associated judicial 
finality in constitutional adjudication with the requirements of 
the rule of law, including in United States v Nixon,185 which held 
that a court could compel the president to surrender tapes of Oval 
Office conversations,186 and Planned Parenthood v Casey,187 which 
involved abortion rights.188 
In the minds of many, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its cer-
tiorari jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in Bush v Gore189 epito-
mized the normally reigning attitude among the justices.190 Alt-
hough divided about much else, the justices apparently agreed 
that the case was meet for judicial decision, despite its obviously 
political subject matter and despite the availability of other insti-
tutions—including Congress, in discharge of its responsibility to 
count the votes submitted by members of the electoral college in 
presidential elections—to resolve disputed issues.191 
 
 181 See Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 Harv L Rev 2312, 2324–25 (2006). 
 182 See Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 301–02 (cited in note 22) (“In the past few dec-
ades, [ ] the Supreme Court has become increasingly blind to its limitations as an institu-
tion—and, concomitantly, to the strengths of the political branches—and . . . acknowl-
edges few limits on its power to say what the law is.”). 
 183 358 US 1 (1958). 
 184 Id at 18. 
 185 418 US 683 (1974). 
 186 See id at 703–14. 
 187 505 US 833 (1992). 
 188 See id at 868 (emphasizing the importance of steadfast and principled judicial deci-
sion-making to a nation of people who respect and “aspire to live according to the rule of law”). 
 189 531 US 98 (2000). 
 190 See Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 273–95 (cited in note 22); Tushnet, 80 NC L Rev 
at 1228–29 (cited in note 58). 
 191 See, for example, Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have De-
cided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 Const Commen 335, 336 (2001) (arguing that 
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Also indicative of the Court’s views is its refusal to tolerate 
any significant space for congressional interpretation of the Con-
stitution in City of Boerne v Flores.192 Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment authorizes Congress “to enforce, by appropriate leg-
islation, the provisions of this article.”193 On a plausible interpre-
tation, Section 5 empowers Congress to prohibit conduct that the 
Supreme Court has not found to violate the Constitution. During 
the 1960s, the Court frequently upheld Congress’s authority to do 
so under the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
as well as the Fourteenth Amendments.194 But City of Boerne 
drew an emphatic distinction between Congress’s power to en-
force and its power to interpret the Civil War Amendments. The 
Court characterized the latter as one that, since Marbury v Mad-
ison,195 has resided exclusively in the judicial branch196—subject, 
presumably, to the narrow exception of the political question doc-
trine. Believing that judicial exclusivity and finality in defining 
constitutional rights are part of the warp and woof of American 
constitutionalism, the Court just as clearly believes that judicial 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation serves vital interests. 
Given the Supreme Court’s exalted appraisal of its role under 
the Constitution, the justices understandably dislike denominat-
ing constitutional questions as political questions. By contrast, 
merits rulings, even when deferential, affirm that judicial juris-
diction and oversight extend to uncharted limits. 
A second reason for the justices to dislike the designation of 
questions as political emerges from the central role that judicially 
manageable standards play in political question cases. Once the 
judicial role in devising judicially manageable standards is made 
explicit, acknowledgment that no judicially manageable stand-
ards exist for the resolution of a dispute constitutes a confession 
 
although “the issues addressed by the Justices in Bush v. Gore plainly presented two fed-
eral questions, . . . the central question in the case should have been resolved through the 
political rather than the judicial process”). 
 192 521 US 507 (1997). 
 193 US Const Amend XIV, § 5. 
 194 See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional 
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 Nw U L 
Rev 47 (2018); Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409 (1968); South Carolina v Katzen-
bach, 383 US 301 (1966); Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641 (1966). 
 195 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 196 See City of Boerne, 521 US at 536. 
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of judicial failure: although it is a judicial function to devise judi-
cially manageable standards, the Court came up short. For obvi-
ous reasons, the Court dislikes confessing failure. 
To be sure, a failure by the Court to develop judicially man-
ageable standards is not necessarily blameworthy. As I noted in 
discussing Rucho, the justices can point to role constraints as af-
fording them a defense.197 Nevertheless, as the recent course of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions under the Commerce Clause has 
illustrated, new cases with previously unforeseen facts can invite 
case-by-case articulations of limits on the powers of another 
branch that a Herculean judiciary could have anticipated earlier. 
By dismissing a case on substantive rather than political question 
grounds, the Court holds open the possibility of successful devel-
opment of judicially manageable limits on other branches’ powers 
in subsequent cases. 
Third, the Supreme Court prefers not to acknowledge the in-
stitutional vulnerability that a labeling of some exercises of judi-
cial power as ultra vires signals. Although the Court rarely voices 
anxiety about its status as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional 
controversies, recognition that some judicial actions would be ul-
tra vires invites questions that the Court would likely prefer to 
avoid.198 For now, suffice it to say that the Court’s institutional 
vulnerability is likely to be felt most acutely when a claim of ju-
dicial jurisdiction to resolve an issue confronts a competing claim 
of jurisdiction by another branch, most paradigmatically the 
executive. 
An admittedly contested historical example may illustrate 
the kind of vulnerability that a charge of ultra vires judicial action 
in a collision with the executive branch might expose. Ex parte 
Merryman arose in Maryland in the aftermath of the Confederate 
firing on Fort Sumter and before the scheduled reconvening of 
Congress to address the secession crisis.199 With Congress out of 
session, President Abraham Lincoln claimed authority to suspend 
access to the writ of habeas corpus, despite the location of the 
Suspension Clause in Article I, among the powers of Congress.200 
 
 197 See note 91 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Con-
straint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution 17–18 (Oxford 
2019) (arguing that the Supreme Court recognizes sometimes complementary and some-
times competing obligations of “fidelity to meaning” and “fidelity to role”). 
 198 I talk more about the possible ramifications of ultra vires judicial action in Part V. 
 199 For an account of the surrounding events and an analysis of the Merryman deci-
sion, see Daniel A. Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 17, 157–63, 188–95 (Chicago 2003). 
 200 See id at 158. 
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Acting pursuant to ostensible authority delegated by the presi-
dent,201 military officials suspended the writ in Maryland,202 
where they detained John Merryman. A petition for the writ was 
nevertheless presented on Merryman’s behalf to Chief Justice 
Roger Taney, who responded with an in-chambers opinion.203 In 
it, the chief justice recounted that he had issued the writ to com-
pel Merryman to be brought before him and that military officials 
had failed to comply.204 Chief Justice Taney further rejected the 
claim that either the president or his delegates could suspend ac-
cess to the writ of habeas corpus without congressional authori-
zation.205 In hopes of achieving compliance with his ruling, Chief 
Justice Taney announced his intention to “order all the proceed-
ings in this case, with [his] opinion, to be . . . transmit[ted], under 
seal, to the president of the United States . . . for that high officer, 
in fulfilment of his constitutional obligation . . . to determine what 
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United 
States to be respected and enforced.”206 Nevertheless, President 
Lincoln took no action to secure the prisoner’s release.207 
In a message to Congress several months later, President 
Lincoln defended the administration’s response to the chief jus-
tice’s ruling by explaining his legal conclusion that the Constitu-
tion permitted his emergency suspension of access to habeas cor-
pus.208 Attorney General Edward Bates subsequently defended 
the refusal of federal officials to comply with Chief Justice Taney’s 
order directing Merryman’s release, essentially on the ground 
 
 201 President Lincoln did not initially issue any public proclamation suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus, but instead authorized its suspension by military commanders in a 
letter to General Winfield Scott. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to General Win-
field Scott (Apr 27, 1861), in Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed, Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and 
Writings 1859–1865: Speeches, Letters, and Miscellaneous Writings, Presidential Messages 
and Proclamations 237 (Library of America 1989). 
 202 There may be a difference between suspending “The Privilege of the Writ,” US 
Const Art I, § 9 (emphasis added), and suspending the writ itself. See Ex parte Milligan, 
71 US (4 Wall) 2, 130–31 (1866) (“The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus does not suspend the writ itself.”). President Lincoln used the latter phrase, which 
now predominates. See Baude, 96 Georgetown L J at 1853 n 255 (cited in note 19). 
 203 See Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution at 17 (cited in note 199). 
 204 See Merryman, 17 F Cases at 147–48. 
 205 See id at 148–49. 
 206 Id at 153. 
 207 Merryman was released eventually and charged with, though never tried for, a 
crime. See Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From the Tower of London 
to Guantanamo Bay ch 7 (2017). 
 208 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in Abra-
ham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859–1865 246, 252–53 (cited in note 201). 
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that suspension of the writ and detention of prisoners under exi-
gent wartime circumstances lay within the judicially unreviewa-
ble discretion of the president.209 By implication, he thus argued 
that the chief justice’s order was ultra vires and, therefore, with-
out legal authority. 
President Lincoln’s actions in purporting to suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus and in refusing to accede to the chief justice’s 
decision in Merryman have provoked voluminous commentary.210 
Constitutional scholars agree with near unanimity that executive 
officials, including the president, must ordinarily obey judicial 
rulings in particular cases, even if they continue to dispute the 
legal reasoning on which those rulings rested, either in the court 
of public opinion or in other cases.211 But some have defended an 
exception to that rule, involving judicial decisions that are ultra 
vires: because ultra vires rulings exceed the jurisdiction of courts 
to issue, presidents and possibly other high federal officials can 
permissibly refuse to comply with them.212 
Applying the concept of ultra vires action to Merryman brings 
several complexities to the fore. On the surface, the question 
whether the president could validly suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus would appear to fall squarely within the jurisdiction of a 
court to resolve. Courts always have jurisdiction to determine 
 
 209 See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op Atty Gen 74, 
79–81 (1861) (Edward Bates).  
 210 See, for example, Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 159–62 (cited in note 199); 
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Great Suspender’s Unconstitutional Suspension of the 
Great Writ, 3 Albany Govt L Rev 575, 614 (2010) (arguing that President Lincoln’s pur-
ported suspension of the writ was unconstitutional because the Suspension Clause exclu-
sively vests the suspension power in Congress); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dan-
gerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L J 217, 278–88 
(1994) (defending President Lincoln’s actions in connection with Merryman as a proper 
exercise of the President’s “coordinate” power to interpret the Constitution). See also gen-
erally Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Ar-
guments Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 U Balt L Rev 11 (2004) (reviewing the con-
temporaneous legal arguments surrounding President Lincoln’s actions in the wake of 
Merryman). 
 211 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations 
for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L Rev 43, 46 (1993) (“[T]here is widespread agreement that 
the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by courts, regard-
less of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for the 
judgment.”). The sole prominent exception may be Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J (cited in 
note 210). See Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L Rev 1267, 1313–14 (1996) (noting Professor Michael 
Stokes Paulsen’s outlier status with regard to this point). 
 212 See Baude, 96 Georgetown L J at 1862 (cited in note 19) (arguing that the judicial 
power to bind the president applies only when a court is acting within its jurisdiction). 
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their own jurisdiction, including by considering whether pur-
ported limits on their jurisdiction are constitutionally valid.213 
To conclude that the chief justice had acted ultra vires, Bates 
therefore had to maintain that the authority to adjudge a judicial 
ruling ultra vires, in a case implicating what the president in-
sisted were judicially unreviewable presidential powers, resided 
in the executive.214 Bates did not claim that the president’s con-
clusion lay beyond all question. Congress, he noted, might have 
responded to executive abuse of power (if it believed that such had 
occurred) by adopting articles of impeachment.215 But apart from 
articles of impeachment or an adverse reaction by voters, Bates 
seemed to assume that the executive branch could and perhaps 
must judge for itself whether a suspension of habeas corpus lay 
within the president’s power and whether a judicial decision to 
issue the writ was ultra vires. 
Bates’s opinion bears directly on the nature and scope of the 
political question doctrine. In stating the president’s case, he ar-
gued that “the whole subject-matter” of how to fight a civil war or 
suppress a rebellion was “political and not judicial”216 and thus, 
apparently, that whether the judicial branch had acted ultra vires 
by intruding into that domain must also be a political question. 
In “deny[ing] that [the president] is under any obligation to obey 
. . . a writ” that interfered with his “political” function in sup-
pressing a rebellion,217 the attorney general’s opinion cited Luther 
v Borden,218 which framed the political question doctrine in juris-
dictional terms and identified some questions as committed to 
Congress and the president, not the courts, for authoritative 
resolution. 
 
 213 See, for example, Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 739 (2008) (“agree[ing]” that 
an applicable statute “deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas 
corpus actions now before us” but proceeding to address the question of the statute’s con-
stitutional validity); Felker v Turpin, 518 US 651, 658 (1996) (commencing inquiry into 
whether a statutory limitation on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction “constitutes 
an unconstitutional restriction”). 
 214 See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op Atty Gen at 
77 (cited in note 209). 
 215 See id at 91. When Congress subsequently discussed Merryman in the course of 
debates about whether to authorize the president to suspend the writ, reactions divided 
along political lines, with Lincoln’s opponents condemning and his supporters approving 
his actions. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 
71 Vand L Rev 465, 493 (2018). 
 216 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op Atty Gen at 86 
(cited in note 209). 
 217 Id at 90. 
 218 See id at 90–91. 
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For the moment, I want to defer all of the questions that Mer-
ryman and President Lincoln’s and Bates’s responses to it raise. 
I come to some of them in Part V. For now, my point is narrow. 
By highlighting jurisdictional limits on the judicial power to in-
terpret the Constitution authoritatively and identifying some 
constitutional questions as committed to other branches, political 
question rulings invite a series of questions—linked as aspects of 
the ultra vires conundrum—that the Supreme Court understand-
ably might think discomfiting, including these: If a court were to 
issue an ultra vires ruling, would it have legally binding effect? 
And who gets to judge whether judicial rulings are ultra vires? 
C. Reasons for Retaining the Political Question Doctrine: 
Signaling Effects 
With the Supreme Court rarely invoking the political ques-
tion doctrine, the question next to be confronted is why the Court 
retains it. Especially in light of the ultra vires problem, why does 
the Court not cast all of its rulings denying plaintiffs’ claims to 
relief as merits decisions, as resting on standing or related doc-
trines, or as involving requests for relief that the law of remedies 
renders unavailable?219 
The best explanation involves signaling. In at least two ways, 
a ruling that a question is nonjusticiable may achieve different 
expressive effects from a decision that rejects a constitutional 
challenge on the merits. 
First, as compared with a decision that a plaintiff’s claim fails 
on the merits, a political question holding characteristically com-
municates a more emphatic message regarding the judicial com-
mitment to a hands-off stance toward a category of disputes and 
thus more decisively underlines the futility of further litigation.220 
The justices in Nixon v United States showed acute cognizance of 
this cuing, though they divided in their response. In the face of 
Justice Souter’s insistence that surely the Senate would violate 
the Constitution if it resolved an impeachment case by flipping a 
coin, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied that the Court would not 
involve itself in impeachment disputes even under circumstances 
 
 219 In response, Henkin argues that the Supreme Court’s failure simply to resolve 
questions on merits, standing, or equitable grounds is confused and misleading. See Hen-
kin, 85 Yale L J at 622 (cited in note 1). 
 220 See, for example, Gerhardt, 44 Duke L J at 245–46 (cited in note 62) (“[A] deter-
mination of nonjusticiability . . . signals once and for all that there is no judicial remedy 
available for any official misconduct within a certain area.”). 
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as extreme as those. Just as adamantly, Justices Souter and 
White thought that the Court should make plain that it had only 
ruled on the case before it, not tendered the Senate a blank 
check.221 
Signaling has played an even larger role in the Supreme 
Court’s debates—culminating in Rucho—about whether chal-
lenges to partisan gerrymandering present political questions. 
Most revealing on this score was the division in Vieth v Jubelirer 
between Justice Scalia, who wrote the plurality opinion, and Jus-
tice Kennedy, who concurred in the result. Justice Scalia believed 
the Court should hold decisively that federal courthouse doors 
were closed to challenges to partisan gerrymanders.222 By con-
trast, Justice Kennedy’s careful insistence that no judicially man-
ageable standards for resolving disputes about gerrymanders had 
yet emerged sought to signal that challengers could continue to 
press gerrymandering complaints and theories, even if their pro-
spects for success were poor: 
The plurality demonstrates the shortcomings of the [ ] stand-
ards that have been considered to date. 
. . .  
[But the fact that] no [adequate] standard has emerged in 
this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge 
in the future. Where important rights are involved, the im-
possibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on 
the side of caution.223 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Rucho sided with 
Justice Scalia. The majority determined categorically that chal-
lenges to partisan gerrymanders present political questions. Alt-
hough Chief Justice Roberts noted that the political question doc-
trine would not apply to state courts adjudicating claims under 
state constitutions,224 he sought to communicate as unequivocally 
as possible that the Article III courts could entertain no future 
 
 221 See notes 119–22 and accompanying text. 
 222 Vieth, 541 US at 305 (Scalia) (plurality) (glossing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
as “a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability at district and statewide levels—a vote that 
may change in some future case but that holds, for the time being, that this matter is 
nonjusticiable”). 
 223 Id at 308–11 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). 
 224 See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507–08. 
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complaints about partisan gerrymanders (that do not offend pre-
viously articulated, judicially enforceable limits such as the one-
person, one-vote norm).225 
Although the justices are probably correct to believe that the 
expressive effects of dismissals on political question grounds are 
more potent than those of rulings on the merits in precluding fu-
ture litigation, neither the Court nor we should exaggerate the 
difference. On the one hand, a merits ruling can sometimes pre-
clude future litigation very decisively. Consider the Supreme 
Court’s determination that there is no constitutional right to have 
electoral districts drawn with the aim of promoting racially pro-
portional representation.226 That ruling leaves little room for ar-
gument in subsequent litigation. On the other hand, after a deci-
sion that one case presents a political question, litigants in a 
future case may substantially repackage their claims under an-
other constitutional provision. Justice Felix Frankfurter thought 
that the vote dilution claim that the Court held justiciable in 
Baker was for all practical purposes identical to the claim that the 
Court had dismissed as nonjusticiable under the Guarantee 
Clause in Colegrove v Green.227 
Moreover, in light of the ultra vires problem that this Article 
has emphasized, a ruling that a challenged action by a nonjudicial 
institution came within that institution’s nonreviewable jurisdic-
tion does not necessarily imply that another assertion of author-
ity by the same actor under the same provision could not be ultra 
vires. To repeat a now-tired example, if the Senate purported to 
impose a punishment on an impeached official that went beyond 
removal from office, the courts would presumably remain open to 
that official’s argument that the Senate had acted ultra vires, not-
withstanding the decision in Nixon. 
Nonetheless, the difference between merits review and ultra 
vires review can be significant, as the law has long recognized in 
 
 225 Id at 2506–08. 
 226 See City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 75–76 (1980) (Stewart) (plurality) (“The 
Equal Protection Clause . . . does not require proportional representation as an imperative 
of political organization.”); id at 86 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (“Neither Gomil-
lion nor any other case decided by this Court establishes a constitutional right to propor-
tional representation for racial minorities.”). 
 227 328 US 549 (1946). See Baker, 369 US at 297 (Frankfurter dissenting) (“The present 
case involves all of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause cases non-justiciable. 
It is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label.”). 
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affirming the narrowness of ultra vires inquiries.228 Nixon is again 
illustrative. The Court’s pointed refusal to mark a decision by coin 
flip as ultra vires shows how limited ultra vires review can be. 
A second signaling effect of the Supreme Court’s denomina-
tion of a question as political rather than judicial is potentially 
more robust. As Professor Black argued, the public may perceive 
judicial decisions that reject constitutional challenges on the mer-
its as conveying messages of approval or “legitimat[ion].”229 In 
Rucho, the Court emphasized that its ruling carried no such mes-
sage. “Our conclusion does not condone excessive partisan gerry-
mandering,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote.230 He added that 
“[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results that rea-
sonably seem unjust” and that “such gerrymandering is ‘incom-
patible with democratic principles.’”231 
Regardless of whether the public accepts the chief justice’s 
protestations, the Court’s invocation of the political question doc-
trine made it possible for him to utter them. Had the Court ruled 
on the merits, it would have been much more complicated to ex-
plain how constitutional provisions that bar “too much”232 parti-
san advantage seeking tolerate the extreme gerrymandering in 
Rucho. 
* * * 
Insofar as the distinctive effect and potential benefit of the 
political question doctrine reside in its signaling effects, the Su-
preme Court needs to weigh the costs and benefits of wanted and 
unwanted signals in determining whether to classify a particular 
constitutional question as beyond judicial jurisdiction to resolve. 
 
 228 See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 Ford-
ham L Rev 753, 772 & n 126 (2014) (noting that courts routinely “manage to resolve[, for 
instance,] . . . whether a federal question is presented without confounding this with the 
resolution of the merits” and criticizing City of Arlington v Federal Communications Com-
mission, 569 US 290 (2013), for denying such a distinction in review of agency action). 
 229 See Charles L. Black Jr, The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a De-
mocracy 80, 86 (Macmillan 1960) (arguing that “judicial review serves an affirmative func-
tion vital to the government of limited powers—the function of keeping up a satisfactorily 
high public feeling that the government has obeyed the law of its own Constitution”). For 
an equally classic argument that the Court should sometimes invoke justiciability doc-
trines to avoid the necessity of either invalidating or legitimating governmental actions, 
see Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 69 (cited in note 130). 
 230 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507. 
 231 Id at 2506, quoting Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, 135 S Ct 2652, 2658 (2015). 
 232 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2489. 
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In some cases, a political question ruling promises to communi-
cate the wanted message that no one should expect the courts to 
involve themselves in constitutional disputes of a particular kind. 
Moreover, even if the Court does not displace a constitutional de-
cision by another branch, neither does the Court affirm or legiti-
mate that decision. At the same time, however, a determination 
that a case presents a political question conveys a reminder—
which courts may dislike emitting—that some imaginable judicial 
rulings would be ultra vires. In any particular case, the effects of 
the latter message would likely prove trivial. Even so, it is easy 
to see, once again, why the Supreme Court would not wish to sig-
nal the limits of its jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution au-
thoritatively and its potential vulnerability to challenge for ultra 
vires decisions very often.233 
V.  THE ULTIMATE POLITICAL QUESTION: IS A JUDICIAL RULING 
ULTRA VIRES? 
This Part confronts the challenges that serious allegations of 
ultra vires action by the judicial branch in failing to apply the 
political question doctrine would pose. It begins by addressing 
two questions that the prospect of ultra vires action by the courts 
make inescapable. First, are ultra vires judicial decisions never-
theless legally and morally binding? Second, if not, then who 
should decide, and who as a sociological matter would have the 
power to decide, whether judicial action is ultra vires? 
With these questions, a new dimension of the concept of po-
litical questions assumes a crystalline importance. One might 
maintain that the courts should decide, authoritatively in all 
cases, whether their decisions are intra vires and thus binding on 
officials of the political branches. But another possibility would 
be that the Constitution, as properly interpreted, assigns the re-
sponsibility for determining whether judicial rulings are ultra 
vires and thus whether they are legally binding to nonjudicial in-
stitutions or officials. 
This Part begins by offering a brisk, negative answer to the 
question whether ultra vires judicial rulings—defined as those in 
which courts overstep the outer bounds of their jurisdiction in 
 
 233 See Tushnet, 80 NC L Rev at 1230–31 (cited in note 58) (arguing that the political 
question doctrine has waned as our legal and political culture has grown more accepting 
of judicial supremacy and as Supreme Court justices have experienced less self-doubt than 
in earlier eras). 
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purporting to resolve a constitutional question—are legally bind-
ing. It then argues that courts cannot authoritatively determine 
the outer boundaries of their own jurisdiction in cases of manifest 
overreach. Although differing in important respects from judi-
cially identified political questions, questions concerning whether 
courts have acted ultra vires and thus forfeited claims to obedi-
ence are political questions in a more ultimate sense, committed 
for authoritative resolution to nonjudicial decision-makers, as 
Attorney General Bates suggested in Merryman.234 In resolving 
such questions, officials of the political branches, and ultimately 
the American people, should afford strong deference to judicial 
rulings, but they should not regard themselves as estopped from 
assessing whether a judicial decision is intra vires. 
A. The Nonbinding Character of Ultra Vires Judicial Rulings 
Almost by definition, a purportedly authoritative decision-
maker acting in excess of legal authority has no legal entitlement 
to obedience. The law recognizes as much in various contexts, in-
cluding that of military justice. Service personnel are obliged to 
obey orders by their superiors within the scope of their superiors’ 
authority, but not if a superior directs manifestly unlawful behav-
ior such as war crimes.235 The difficulty lies in tracing the outer 
bounds of legal authority once it is recognized that jurisdiction 
encompasses the authority to decide erroneously, sometimes in-
cluding about the scope of an institution’s actual jurisdiction.236 I 
return to this point below. 
 
 234 See notes 209–18 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States Rule 916(d) (2012) (“It is a defense 
to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the 
orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known 
the orders to be unlawful.”). 
 236 Some older Supreme Court decisions hold that officials subject to writs of manda-
mus issued in excess of jurisdiction need not comply with the orders. See, for example, Ex 
parte Ayers, 123 US 443, 485–87 (1887); Ex parte Rowland, 104 US 604, 617–18 (1881). In 
Ex parte Fisk, 113 US 713, 718 (1885), the Court differentiated between the obligation to 
obey contempt orders made in error and the right to disobey orders made outside the ju-
risdiction of the court. More recently, United States v United Mine Workers of America, 
330 US 258 (1947), affirmed the existence of an obligation to obey even constitutionally 
erroneous judicial orders, but in a case 
where, as here, the subject matter of the suit, as well as the parties, was properly 
before the court; where the elements of federal jurisdiction were clearly shown; 
and where the authority of the court of first instance to issue an order ancillary 
to the main suit depended upon a statute, the scope and applicability of which 
were subject to substantial doubt. 
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Moral authority does not necessarily track legal authority.237 
Under some circumstances, a person or institution without legal 
authority could acquire morally legitimate authority from some 
other source, such as the imperative demands of justice or public 
safety under emergency conditions.238 But a court claiming moral 
authority to resolve a question that is properly within the juris-
diction of another branch would need to carry an extraordinary 
burden of justification. There would have to be moral grounds not 
only for the court’s overstepping its own jurisdiction, but also for 
usurping the jurisdiction of one or more other legally legitimate 
institutions.239 
B. Who Should Decide? 
The second question, involving who gets to decide whether a 
judicial decision is ultra vires, is more difficult. In a variety of 
contexts, courts have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdic-
tion—for example, to ascertain whether a plaintiff has standing, 
whether a complaint states a claim on which relief could be 
granted, or whether a statute purporting to confer or limit judicial 
jurisdiction is constitutionally valid.240 Moreover, as I have em-
 
Id at 294. Some commentators have read United Mine Workers as affirming an obligation 
to obey contempt orders and as permitting collateral attacks on them in subsequent pro-
ceedings only in cases involving a frivolous or insubstantial basis for the assertion of  
subject matter jurisdiction. See John R.B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Chal-
lenging a Court Order After Disobeying It, 88 Cornell L Rev 215, 233 (2002). 
 237 In distinguishing legal from moral legitimacy, see notes 99–103 and accompanying 
text, I embrace a positivist theory of law, see Fallon, 86 NC L Rev at 1126 & n 69 (cited 
in note 146), but one that invites distinctions between morally legitimate and morally il-
legitimate law. 
 238 See Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality 3, 9–10 (Oxford 1979). 
 239 As a possible example, a plausible interpretation of the events surrounding Mer-
ryman would be that President Lincoln acted with moral even if not with legal authority 
when he purported to suspend access to the writ of habeas corpus and that executive offi-
cials similarly acted morally legitimately in defying the writ of habeas corpus that Chief 
Justice Taney issued. See also Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 37–38 (cited in note 99) 
(advancing a similar argument about Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954), in which the 
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which was 
ratified at a time when the Constitution tolerated slavery, barred race discrimination in 
the District of Columbia schools). 
 240 See, for example, Bell v Hood, 327 US 678, 682 (1946) (noting that “the court must 
assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the 
court can grant relief”); Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 739 (2008) (recognizing jurisdic-
tion to inquire into validity of a statutory restriction on jurisdiction). 
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phasized is generally the case with jurisdiction, jurisdiction to de-
termine jurisdiction can include a power to decide erroneously but 
nevertheless authoritatively.241 
In plumbing the scope of courts’ authority to determine their 
own jurisdiction, analysis can begin with Professor Hart’s idea of 
a rule of recognition. Despite his central focus on the courts, Hart 
contemplated that the practices of nonjudicial officials might play 
a part in determining a society’s rule or rules of recognition.242 In 
seeking clarity on this point, we should recognize that different 
rules of recognition might apply to different categories of officials. 
For instance, Supreme Court precedent binds lower court judges 
but not necessarily the justices. For lower court judges and other 
officials, we thus might say as a first approximation: whatever 
the Supreme Court says or has said is law, and has not overruled, 
is law. But that prescription would not hold for the justices, for 
whom adherence to stare decisis is not an absolute requirement. 
Nor should we assume that the simple formula “Whatever the Su-
preme Court says is law” holds categorically even for all nonjudi-
cial officers. For example, there could, in principle, be an excep-
tion for Supreme Court rulings that were ultra vires, such as a 
hypothetical judicial decision directing the House to vote articles 
of impeachment against the president and the Senate to vote for 
conviction. 
According to Hart, questions about the content of the rule of 
recognition typically have factual answers.243 And if we look to 
history, officials almost invariably accede to Supreme Court deci-
sions, including rulings on the outer boundaries of judicial power 
that the officials regard as misguided. From this practice, one 
might infer that officials feel a legal obligation to accept judicial 
decisions about the scope of judicial power. If so, a practice-based 
analysis might point toward the conclusion that the rule of recog-
nition that applies to nonjudicial officials dictates this result. 
But we should not let our inferences run ahead of the evi-
dence, as I sought to signal by imagining an order by the Supreme 
Court directing the House to impeach and the Senate to convict 
the president on charges of high crimes and misdemeanors. Such 
an order would run in the teeth of the Constitution and, in the 
view of any reasonable observer, would lie beyond the outer pe-
rimeter of the Court’s lawful authority to render. If we ask 
 
 241 See notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 242 See Hart, Concept of Law at 116 (cited in note 18). 
 243 See id. 
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whether it would bind legally and morally conscientious members 
of the House and Senate, I do not believe that historical practice 
determines a clear answer. In a case exhibiting this degree of 
egregiousness, the historical practice of official accession to other 
judicial orders notwithstanding, I believe we could expect officials 
to look at one another and ask, Must we accept a judicial deter-
mination in this kind of case, the precise likes of which we have 
never seen before, in which the judicial overreach seems so clear 
and so serious? 
If this question arose in enough minds, it could not be an-
swered as one of fact. The most relevant fact would be that the 
officials whose felt obligations and resulting behavior fix the con-
tent of the rule of recognition were divided or uncertain in their 
judgments. Nor, it is important to see, should the question in is-
sue be interpreted as involving whether officials are obliged to 
obey the law. Rather, in a case in which the rule of recognition 
picks out no determinate answer, the issue becomes one of consti-
tutional role morality, which could itself be framed as one about 
how relevant officials could best promote the moral legitimacy of 
the American constitutional order: Under what circumstances, if 
any, should a conscientious official feel entitled or possibly obliged 
to disregard a judicial pronouncement? 
Two possible approaches stand out. According to the first, it 
would better promote the rule of law and other relevant values 
for conscientious officials and citizens to accept judicial rulings on 
the outer boundaries of judicial jurisdiction as authoritative, even 
if fair-minded observers would adjudge the judicial rulings ultra 
vires. The foundation for this view traces to a conception of the 
rule of law requiring that some institution should have the au-
thority to furnish final, binding decisions of disputed legal ques-
tions.244 If one accepts that premise, the most plausible ultimate 
arbiter within our system is the judicial branch.245 As the Su-
preme Court wrote in Marbury v Madison, “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
 
 244 See, for example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv L Rev 1359, 1371–75 (1997). 
 245 See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A 
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is.”246 As Justice Jackson explicated in a later case, “We are not 
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because 
we are final.”247 This position also resonates with the iconic argu-
ment of Thomas Hobbes that sovereign authority to say what the 
law is must reside in a single body for the benefits of the rule of 
law to be realized.248 
An alternative conception of the rule of law, which draws in-
spiration and support from the republican political tradition, op-
poses ceding “control over the law to any one individual or 
body.”249 In a series of thoughtful essays, Professor Gerald 
Postema has recently championed the republican position over 
the Hobbesian premise that the rule of law requires the vesting 
of unchallengeable authority to say what the law is in a single 
decision-maker.250 In a governmental regime that purports to be 
one “of laws, not of men [and women],”251 the Hobbesian concep-
tion furnishes no answer to the worry, Who will guard the guard-
ians? The best response, Postema maintains, requires that those 
who rule in the name of the law should themselves be ruled by 
law.252 According to him, “[r]eflexivity—law ruling those who rule 
with law and in its name—is the rule of law’s sine qua non.”253 
And the requisite reflexivity can exist, Postema argues, only if all 
officials—judges and justices as much as others—are locked in 
networks of mutual and reciprocal accountability for their fidelity 
to the law. 
Stated in that abstract form, Postema’s argument does not 
directly establish the form that an ideal accountability network, 
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in which judges not only hold others accountable to law but can 
be held accountable themselves, ought to take. In a minimal con-
ception, it might suffice for judges to be accountable only to each 
other or to be subject to professional criticism in law reviews. A 
more robust conception of accountability networks aimed at en-
suring fidelity to law by judges as well as other officials has re-
sounded through American history under the rubric of “depart-
mentalism.”254 As formulated by Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison, among others, departmentalism holds that the three 
branches or departments of the federal government are coequal, 
with each having authority to decide for itself what the Constitu-
tion means or requires.255 Ordinarily, departmentalists typically 
acknowledge, executive officials in particular should defer to ju-
dicial rulings in cases to which they are parties.256 But in im-
portant cases of perceived judicial overreach, the departmentalist 
view leaves open the possibility that the president could and 
sometimes should act on his or her own conscientious view of 
what the Constitution requires.257 
Merryman furnishes a possible example of departmentalism 
in practice. For the executive branch, President Lincoln deter-
mined that he possessed constitutional authority to suspend ac-
cess to the writ of habeas corpus. Acting with the authority of the 
judicial branch, Chief Justice Taney disagreed and issued the 
writ. The executive then invoked the departmentalist prerogative 
not to accede. In response to the resulting showdown, Congress 
could have added its voice to the mix: the House of Representa-
tives could have sided with the chief justice by voting articles of 
impeachment against the president or with the president by vot-
ing articles of impeachment against the chief justice. In the event, 
it did neither. And with or without congressional action, the 
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American public could have claimed a role in the contest over ex-
ecutive and judicial power. By voting in subsequent elections, the 
electorate could have registered its approval or disapproval of the 
constitutional positions adopted by electorally accountable actors.258 
To many contemporary Americans, the departmentalist ap-
proach looks clumsy, chaotic, and frightening.259 When it is taken 
in undiluted form, I agree.260 Nonetheless, Postema persuades me 
that an unalloyed embrace of judicial supremacy—in which Su-
preme Court pronouncements of what the law is or requires are 
accepted as self-validating by all other officials—is equally unten-
able. As he puts it, according any official or institution a bound-
less authority to determine its own jurisdiction leaves no logical 
space between a claim of lawful authority and an assertion of po-
tentially arbitrary power.261 
In my view, the most reasonable accommodation of compet-
ing rule-of-law ideals—even in cases involving plausible allega-
tions of ultra vires action by the judicial branch—calls for a very 
strong but not absolutely irrebuttable presumption that final ju-
dicial rulings authoritatively settle the obligations of the parties. 
Since it is the function of adjudication to resolve questions about 
which conscientious officials and citizens reasonably might dif-
fer,262 the limit to deference or accession should come only at the 
point of unmistakable judicial overreach. Such a standard is nei-
ther unworkable nor unprecedented. To cite a comparative law 
example, the German Constitutional Court claims jurisdiction to 
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determine whether decisions by the institutions of the European 
Union, including the European Court of Justice, are ultra vires—
in which case they would not be binding in Germany—but it has 
“always rejected” claims of ultra vires action.263 Although I do not 
mean to overstate the determinacy of applicable rules of recogni-
tion, historical practice of American officials in acceding to nearly 
all judicial rulings exhibits a felt constitutional duty of compli-
ance in all but extreme cases. I have implicitly acknowledged as 
much by relying on an improbable hypothetical—involving a ju-
dicial order to the House to impeach and the Senate to convict a 
sitting president—to illustrate my conceptual point about judicial 
accountability for fidelity to law. 
Looking to constitutional practice for markers of ultra vires 
judicial action that would have no entitlement to obedience, one 
might start with the range of considerations that are convention-
ally accepted as relevant to constitutional interpretation, includ-
ing, for example, arguments based directly on the words of the 
Constitution’s text, arguments regarding various provisions’ his-
torical meanings, arguments based on precedent, and arguments 
based on the Constitution’s structure.264 If an assertion of judicial 
power were not plausibly supportable based on any of these kinds 
of arguments, it would likely be ultra vires, with the likelihood 
increasing if the courts lacked the functional capacity to make 
sound decisions in the domain over which they had asserted au-
thority. The potential of a particular judicial order to occasion 
catastrophically bad consequences might also matter. In a possi-
ble example, President Lincoln, in the aftermath of the Merryman 
case, noted that he had suspended the writ in response to an ex-
istential threat to the United States.265 
I emphasize, however, that it is not part of my project here to 
resolve the debates that have long surrounded Merryman. My 
present interest lies more in establishing a point of constitutional 
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and moral principle than in determining how that principle 
should have been applied in the secession crisis. For that purpose, 
two observations will suffice. First, Merryman involved the un-
precedented and so far unrepeated circumstances of an impend-
ing civil war. Second, Chief Justice Taney issued his ruling in 
Merryman in his capacity as a circuit justice, not on behalf of the 
Supreme Court as an institution. Under an appropriately defer-
ential standard, I believe that the Supreme Court may never have 
issued a decision that conscientious officials should have thought 
themselves entitled to defy. 
C. Political Questions and Ultimate Political Questions 
If questions about whether particular judicial rulings are ul-
tra vires and not deserving of obedience are constitutional ques-
tions to be resolved by institutions other than the judiciary, they 
constitute the ultimate political questions within our system of 
government. Ultimate political questions differ from judicially 
identified political questions. Their status as such does not re-
quire judicial designation, nor does it depend on the judicially 
identified criteria outlined in Baker v Carr and subsequent 
cases.266 What makes ultimate political questions political is that 
nonjudicial actors must resolve them. What makes them ultimate 
is that they define the outer boundaries of judicial power to say 
which questions are political questions and which are judicial 
questions. 
Ultimate political questions also have a further connection to 
the judicially defined political question doctrine: they directly im-
plicate, and constitute a response to, the ultra vires conundrum. 
Ultimate political questions arise, if they arise at all, when non-
judicial officials believe that a purported judicial resolution of 
conflicting claims of judicial and extrajudicial jurisdiction is itself 
ultra vires. In a showdown between the judicial and nonjudicial 
branches of government about which is intra and which is ultra 
vires, it would be important to distinguish normative from empir-
ical questions. 
As a normative matter, it would be impossible to say categor-
ically whether the courts or a nonjudicial institution ought to pre-
vail. The law should rule, even when authority to speak in the 
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name of the law is contested. And if the law were underdetermi-
nate, then those who had to decide whom to obey should do so 
based on considerations of moral legitimacy. Either way, analysis 
would need to be case specific. 
If we turn from normative issues to empirical projections, the 
outcome of a showdown over whether the judiciary had acted ul-
tra vires would almost certainly depend on the balance of respect 
and support for the clashing institutions among relevant constit-
uencies. Seeking to offer simultaneous explanations of the exist-
ence of judicial review and the recognized limits on its scope, po-
litical scientists maintain that judicial power operates within 
politically constructed bounds.267 A simplified summary of that 
thesis posits that the Supreme Court’s authority to resolve con-
stitutional issues conclusively exists only insofar as its decisions 
are ones that Congress, the president, and ultimately the bulk of 
the American public will accept as lying within the Court’s juris-
diction to render. When a roughly defined balance of power be-
tween courts and political actors has emerged, the prevailing 
equilibrium will support rules of recognition under which political 
officials know that if they disobey judicial judgments, they will 
face condemnation and sanctions, either by Congress, including 
through its power over impeachment, or by the American public, 
voting in elections. Correspondingly, if courts were perceived as 
going too far, and if Congress and the public backed a president 
who defied a judicial order, then politics would mark a practical 
limit on judicial power.268 
Once the dynamics of power come into view, neither logic nor 
normative political theory nor my proposed standards of defer-
ence to judicial rulings on the limits of judicial power can exclude 
the possibility that every judicial ruling might give rise to an ul-
timate political question. But conditions in which claims of ultra 
vires judicial action became routine or even recurrent would be 
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pathological. If such conditions should ever develop, fault might 
lie with political officials, with the courts, or with both. If the con-
ditions for cooperative governance collapsed, the electorate would 
likely also bear some responsibility. One way or another, the rule 
of law would have broken down. 
Nevertheless, short of that unhappy state, not every isolated 
overreach of judicial power—whether actual or mistakenly at-
tributed—would evidence a legal system that had run incorrigibly 
off the rails. Actual or threatened defiance of judicial rulings 
could function as a corrective to judicial overreach. In addition, 
recognition that ultimate political questions could arise, and that 
they would signify constitutional crises that all should wish to 
avoid, may help to keep our constitutional order in a tolerably 
functioning condition. The relative continuing success of constitu-
tional government under law depends on the humility and good 
sense of a multitude of actors. 
In sum, the concept of political questions—in both its doctri-
nal and its ultimate senses—begins and ends with apprehensions 
of, and responses to, ultra vires action by one or another branch 
of government, including the judiciary. Where to draw the rele-
vant bounds—defining the jurisdiction of the courts, on the one 
hand, and the authority of other institutions, on the other hand—
is in the first instance a judicial question. But once the Supreme 
Court has pronounced its judgment, it is always possible that a 
political question might arise about whether the Court’s decision 
was ultra vires. The rarity with which that question has pre-
sented itself historically does not signal that it could not arise, 
nor that the possibility of the question’s arising lacks either the-
oretical or practical importance. Rather, contemplation of the pos-
sibility of ultra vires judicial action should teach a lesson about 
the foundations of our, and possibly any other, constitutional re-
gime. Responsibility for upholding the minimal requirements of 
the rule of law—including by respecting and enforcing the bound-
aries of constitutionally empowered institutions’ lawful jurisdic-
tion—must be shared among a network of accountability-holding 
institutions that centrally includes, but is not limited to, the 
judiciary.269 
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CONCLUSION 
The political question doctrine highlights both the limits of 
judicial power and the potential vulnerability of claims of judicial 
authority. If any single concept furnishes a key to understanding 
the doctrine, it is that of ultra vires action. The political question 
doctrine acknowledges that judicial efforts to resolve some ques-
tions would be ultra vires. But in recognizing that other branches 
have the authority to make conclusive determinations regarding 
the proper resolution of political questions, courts, willy-nilly, re-
tain a responsibility to ensure that the other branches do not act 
ultra vires, either. 
As formulated and applied in cases such as Nixon v United 
States and Rucho v Common Cause, the political question doc-
trine is a judicial construction. Its contours are vague and dis-
puted. In this Article, I have tried to explain why the Supreme 
Court so rarely invokes the political question doctrine, despite the 
breadth of the doctrine’s supporting rationales. Among other rel-
evant factors, the arguments that would support identifying a 
question as political frequently overlap indistinguishably with ar-
guments for upholding a challenged action on the merits. 
This Article has also identified previously unrecognized con-
nections between judicially identified political questions and 
what I have called ultimate political questions. The latter are 
questions about the validity of judicial pronouncements that 
claim to mark the permissible limits of judicial authority. Though 
courts may attempt to resolve issues about the outer reaches of 
their own power, judicial answers that are ultra vires, as gauged 
by an appropriately deferential measure, would have no legal title 
to obedience. The disobedience of a judicial order could have ter-
rifying, quasi-anarchic consequences. But the theoretical possibil-
ity of disobedience should occasion no regret. Political questions 
in the ultimate sense—which provide the backdrop against which 
courts recognize political questions in the doctrinal sense—oc-
cupy the conceptual terrain that separates constitutional govern-
ment under law from government by judiciary. 
